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This thesis is an unclassified examination from a
Western perspective of the concepts of limited war, and
escalation control in the context of nuclear conflict and
command, control and communications ( C3 ) . Limited war and
escalation control are intrinsically related. To better
understand the relationships between limited war, escalation
control and C3 , as applied to the question of protracted
nuclear war, this thesis considers strategic control from a
cybernetic view, using a widely accepted model for the
command and control process. U. S. strategic C3 systems are
discussed from the perspective of limiting war and control-
ling escalation. Requirements such as, a viable National
Command Authority, effective command and control, positive/
negative control, damage control/assessment, a shared
concept of limited war, civil defense, and a mechanism to
terminate conflict are presented as necessary to control
escalation, thus, limiting war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thermo-nuclear war is popularly believed to spell the
end of man and civilization in general as we know it.
Nuclear war does not necessarily and automatically lead to
total destruction, even for the primay participants. This
premise implies waging a limited war where the participants
hold back their total destructive force and prosecute a war
of limited objectives without the conflict escalating to
levels of total war-- where the continuation of civiliza-
tion, "as we know it" would be questionable.
Because of the virtually unlimited destructive power of
nuclear weapons, warfare has changed significantly.
Intrinsic limitations to combat existed prior to 1945 when
nuclear weapons were first used. Before Hiroshima-Nagasaki,
conventional weapons (chemical explosives) were limited in
their destructive power, and in the accuracy of their
delivery systems. Accuracy was good but did not match the
pinpoint accuracy today of 'smart weapons'. Technological
limitations constrained even all-out efforts toward total,
unlimited war. Modest payloads (modest by today's stan-
dards) and uncertain accuracy in hitting targets limited
effectiveness and created doubt in the efficacy of strategic
bombing for purposes of dealing the coup de gras to the
enemy. To some, strategic bombing was just another form of
attrition warfare. Critics of Allied strategic bombing of
Germany during WWII questioned whether it would actually
affect or hasten the outcome of the war. Eventually, after
institututing day-time raids, and with a substantial
increase in monthly ordinance, allied bombing raids in
Europe did pay off. Even so, the psychological effect on the
civilian populace was considered just as important as the
destruction of industrial and political centers.
[Ref. 1: pp. 10-12]
With immensly powerful nuclear weapons matched to
extremely accurate delivery systems, 1 changed forever is the
notion of hitting at the heart of the enemy. Strategic
bombing is no longer a form of attrition warfare, it is the
method of dealing the quick thrust to the heart of the
enemy, having the awesome effect of possibly forever
changing the political, economic, and social structure of
the recipiant. Estimates from the Office of Technology
Assessment, 1979 study on the effects of nuclear weapons
cite 2-160 million Americans dead from a Soviet nuclear
attack. The large size of the estimate interval is due to
the uncertainty in the type of attack and the status of the
population at the time of the attack. These deaths are from
prompt radiation, blast and short term fallout. Not
included in the estimates are the long term effects from a
ruined economy, long term radiation, inadequate health care,
starvation, crime and insurrection, new social orders, etc.
,
etc. Given an unlimited strike against this country we can
expect a total disruption of our social, political and
economic system.
When dealing with an adversary in the international
arena, a high priority of government should be to avoid
nuclear war. But if the use of nuclear weapons becomes a
certain necessity, for any reason, then, along with the
political objective must come the objective of keeping the
conflict constrained to within certain limitations.
During conflict many interactions occur between bellig-
erents. These interactions can be obvious such as, direct
combat between ground forces, and some not so obvious such
as maneuvering at the diplomatic level, positioning of
forces at the geo-strategic level, or signalling and
Circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a
circular distribution within which 50% of the missiles are
expected to fall. Unclassified CEP s are now typically
0. 1-0. 2 miles.
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bargaining. In order to constrain a nuclear exchange to
limited proportions, control must be maintained of these
interaction between the belligerents. Control seems an
obvious requirement for limiting nuclear war, but what
exactly is controling nuclear war, or, 'strategic battle
management'? How do we know when we have it or don't have
it? What are the systems that support strategic battle
management and are they adequate to support the concept of
limited nuclear war? Does the United States adhere to the
concept of limited war? If engaging in total nuclear war is
assumed to be suicidal, and it generally is, and, if deter-
rence fails, then the primary objective will be to limit
war. Does our command, control and communications ( C3
)
system support this notion of limiting wars, and at the same
time attaining the political objective which precipitated
the conflict?
We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each
capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of
his own life.
These words of Robert Oppenheimer succinctly describe
the relationship between the two nuclear superpowers. But
if the risk is taken by the nuclear powers that war will not
be suicidal, then it must be recognized that the war will be
fought toward limited ends and the problem of controlling
the conflict, i. e. , controlling escalation, will be the para-
mount objective. This is something of a contradiction, since
the objective of keeping limited war limited is the attain-
ment of limited political goals which preceeded and necessi-
tated the exchange. Lawrence Freedman, in his book, "The
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy", attributes the following
quote to Liddell Hart, the father of limited war, after the
bombing of Hiroshima.
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When both sides possess atomic power. total warfare
makes nonsense. Total warfare implies that the aim, the
effort and the degree of violence are unlimited.
Victory is pursued without regard to the consequences .
. . . Any limited war waged with atomic power would be
worse than nonsense, it would be mutually suicidal.
This makes sense! Then, assuming the participants not to be
suicidal psychopaths, it will be through limited actions and
limited means, that nuclear war should be fought, if it is
to be fought at all.
But what does limited war mean in the nuclear age?
Would it be possible for nuclear belligerents to constrain
themselves after having been on the receiving end of an ICBM
attack, perhaps after having lost a substantial portion of
their population? Would the president respond in kind if he
knew 50 million Americans had just been killed by a Soviet
counterforce attack; and that his response meant a Soviet
counter response against American cities was a certainty?
How could he not respond given typical political pressures
from home and from allies to respond in some manner? What
would keep one side or the other from using all its nuclear
assets early in conflict if it feared it may lose them?
Once the threshold, or 'fire -break' 2 of first use has been
breached, to keep from falling into a total nuclear confron-
tation, the war must be limited and it must remain so by
definition. To accomplish this no less than amazing feat,
escalation must be controlled and it must be mutually under-
stood, if only tacitly, by both sides, since for any war to
remain limited, it must be limited by all participants.
In order to better understand the dynamics of limiting
nuclear war and to identify the relationship of some
elements of nuclear war to strategic command, control and
communications, this paper will examine concepts of limited
2
Fire-breaks are the threshold points at which very
sharp changes in escalation take place leading to nuclear
war. These are threshold points in Herman Kahn s escalation
ladder [ Ref s. 1,2: pp. 217,6].
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nuclear war from a Western perspective, the requisite
control necessary to keep limited war limited, that is, to
control escalation, and the systems and organizations
currently expected to control strategic battle management.
13
II. LIMITED WAR
The concept of limited war in the nuclear era presents
many penetrating problems of military interest. One problem
asks the question: Does the United States have a command
and control system that will support the control of escala-
tion and thereby keep a limited war limited? This chapter
will examine some aspects of limited war. It is important
to realize that Western beliefs of limited war may not be
equally held by the Soviet Union. If true, this conceptual
asymmetry between East and West presents a problem to the
limiting process, and will be discussed later. The
following is a Western view of limited war.
A. NUCLEAR STRATEGIES
1. Massive Retaliation
The early U. S. nuclear policy of massive retalia-
tion, whereby deterrence is maintained by the threat of a
total and massive nuclear response to any communist inspired
aggression has been gradually rejected and replaced by a
policy of assurred destruction and flexible response.
Massive retaliation had many flaws, some theoretical, some
moral, but mostly the doctrine of massive retaliation
contained a paradox that theorists and polititians could not
resolve: Since total war is assumed to be totally destruc-
tive for all participants and is therefore, suicidal; then,
if the deterrent threat of assured destruction fails it
becomes suicidal to carry out the threat and the deterrent
policy is nothing more than a bluff. Massive retaliation is
actually thought in some circles to be destabilizing and
therefore, increases the threat of nuclear war. An empty
14
threat would seriously reduce the credibility of the U. S.
deterrent for effectiveness and may invite worldwide aggres-
sion and/or attack against this country. A deterrent threat
is only effective if it is believed to be reasonably cred-
ible by the opponent. [ Ref . 1]
2. Flexible Response
Beginning with the Kennedy administration and prin-
cipally behing the suppport of then Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, the concept of 'flexible response' grew
from the need for options other than total nuclear war,
ineffectual response, or no response at all to communist
aggression. Flexible response called for balanced and, if
required, incremental response options, conventional and
non-conventional, to all levels of aggression. What was
sought was a response menu covering any and all circum-
stances requiring a response. If the only options left to
American leaders boil down to total and most likely suicidal
war, or, no response at all followed by a grave loss in
political esteem and power, the leaders are ham-strung and
the situation becomes destabilized. Would the president of
the United States risk the loss of hundreds of millions of
lives in order to save face in the international scene;
would he choose to not respond at all to a serious trans-
gression by the Soviets, afraid to play the nuclear card?
The National Command Authority (NCA) must have more than the
choice of total war, or 'strategic retreat', because other-
wise, we are "likened to two scorpions in a bottle".
According to Bruce Blair, "A strategy of flexible response
sets up an elaborate experiment in conflict resolution,
requiring an ability to tailor responses, to test and learn
and to adopt to changing circumstances." [Ref. 3: p. 212]
This implies an ability to control the process of war.
Flexible response, which provides the national deci-
sion makers, principally the National Command Authority
15
(NCA), the ability to act according to the threat. It
provides for a response to be tailored to the situation
necessitating the action; at any place and in any manner in
the choosing of the NCA. Flexible response is intended to
offer alternatives. The cost/benefit is calculated for each
option and one is chosen to either maximize the strategic
payoff or the political objective. NATO adopted the
strategy of flexible response in 1967 and in a communique
stated:
The concept is based on a flexible and balanced range of
appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all
levels of aggression, or threats of aggression. These
responses, subject to appropriate political control, are
designed first to deter aggression and thus preserve
?eace: but, should aggression unhappily occur, to main-
ain the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area .
[Ref. l:p. 285]
After all, deterrence for national security should not be
based on genocide and terror, but rather upon a rational and
gradual response in kind to any and all communist aggression
if war is to be constrained. It will be more effective to
deter by convincing the enemy of purposeful and certain
response, executed effectively, than it is to deter by fear.
Deterring by fear may provoke the opponent into the very
response meant to be deterred.
Deliberately included in the NATO communique is
political control over the response. Political control
becomes a crucial element and is fundamental to the notion
of control of limited war. As I will discuss later, the
relationship of politics to limited war is tightly bound and
becomes a major control element. But what is this thing
called limited war, the concept that flexible response
implies?
3. Limited vs . Unlimited War
Robert Osgood, an early strategic theorist in
America described limited war as:
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One in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for
which they fight to concrete. well defined objectives
that do not demand the utmost military effort of which
the belligerents are capable and that can be accomodated
in a negotiated settlement. [ Ref . 4: p. 1]
Osgood further constrained limited war to two ( or
few) players; targets selected strictly for their military
importance; specific geographic areas; and a specific
political objective [Ref. 4: p. 2]. The scope of the action,
i. e. , the limited war, must be kept within the confines of
the political objective and political control for the war to
remain limited. Since warfare is not an end in itself, but
a means to an end, the war should revolve around and be
controlled by the objective, or the end, and that objective,
usually political, should exercise some control over the
action. This is in contrast to unlimited war that Osgood
describes as:
. . . war . . . fought with every means available in
order to achieve ends that are without objective limits
or that are limited only by the capability of the
belligerents to destroy the enemy's ability to resist.
[Ref. 4: p. 2]
That is, unlimited war is characterized by no well defined
objectives—the only objective is to win; or is character-
ized by the situation where limited war begins to go out of
control and the original objectives are replaced by the more
highly sought and immediate goal of not losing; where the
players are compelled to fight on at all costs.
Most importantly though, is to link the political
objectives to the limitation. For, without political objec-
tives war becomes politically unlimited and termination
becomes elusive. If the objectives are unlimited, then when
do you stop? When do you say we've reached the end of the
action and now it's time to compromise and settle the
dispute? Short of total military committment, elements of
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termination, compromise and settlement possibilities must
exist to control war, thus limiting its nature. Without
these elements there is no motivation for restriction in the
action; without motivation for restriction there is no"
limitation. Of course, unlimited wars too have constraints,
giving them an element of limited character. A well worn
example is the non-use of chemical weapons during World War
II when all sides possessed the capacity. And too, limited
war can seem unlimited in some respects, especially if the
limitations are one sided. This could be the case if one
belligerent, seemingly with unlimited resources were at war
with an opponent of lesser resources. The waring party with
many resources may feel the war is limited, whereas the
party with less, may feel the war to be of an unlimited
nature, since it demands most of its effort and resources.
This produces an asymmetry between opponents in viewing the
conflict, and may result in miscalculation in subsequent
decisions and actions. Miscalculation may then cause the
conflict to slip beyond previous constraints.
B. TRADITION AND PERCEPTION
Much of the idea of limited war is dependent upon the
perspective of the observer. To some, any war is unlimited
and out of control; and the nature of war is treated like an
illness to be cured at all costs. Thomas Schelling, an
early "formal strategist" 3 believed a division existed
dividing conflict theorists
. . . between those that treat conflict as a patholog-
ical state and seek its causes and treatment. and those
that take conflict for granted and study the behavior
associated with it. [Ref. 5: p. 3]
3 Lawrence Freedman describes formal strategists as those
prescribing to elements and tools of game theory for
stateg.ic insight. Formal Strategists attempted to build a
new strategic outlook not based on East-West relations but
relevant to them, and use deciplined and formalized
reasoning as major tools of analysis. Other formal strate-
gists were Herman Kahn. Mortan Kaplan. Daniel Ellsberg,
Oskar Morganstern, et al. [Ref. l:p. 181]
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Warfare is not an illness but rather one of many states
of relationship between societies, as normal as birth and
death. And, since it is a natural occurrance in the history
of man it can be studied as such and a rational description
of its composition and complexities is useful. [ Ref . 5: p.
3]
Schelling, a game theorist in strategic matters believed
conflict to be essentially situations of bargaining, occur-
ring between conflicting players. This fits in well with
Osgoods requirement for room for compromise and settlement
leading to termination and thus limiting warfare. If no
bargaining were possible to terminate the war under some
favorable conditions, then, there is no point in keeping the
war limited. Schelling though believed limited war to be
strongly dependent upon tradition, precedent, convention and
the force of suggestion. [Ref. 5: p. 260]
There is a traditional worldwide revulsion to the use of
nuclear weapons, so, anything involving their use must be
avoided at all cost, or, if not avoided, at least limited.
Another tradition of nuclear weapons is their, non-use. 'The
bomb' has not been used since Hiroshima-Nagasaki; tran-
scending that de facto moratorium presents the crossing of a
threshold beyond which control of the process of war may be
difficult or lost. Once the threshold of first use is
crossed, further use may be more readily resorted to. The
first crossing will be the most difficult, but once it has
been made, the shock value will be gone and a second use may
be easier. So, transcending that saliency is avoided or at
least limited. Schelling states:
Traditions or conventions are not simply an analogy for
limits in war, or a curious aspect of them; tradition
or precedent or convention is the essence of the limits.
[Ref. 5: p. 260]
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Of fundamental importance is that the warring parties
all perceive the traditions and precedents which shall limit
war. The total perception need not be equal but there
should be a mutual recognition that wars can be limited.
This recognition may be agreed upon or tacit; but, if either
side feels unsure of this mutual recognition, then uncer-
tainty is injected into the equation of balancing the limi-
tations on war--stressing the situation and escalation may
result. That is, the intended limits of the action must be
perceptible by both parties. Not only does this imply an
effective command and control system at home, but also
implies an information link between warring parties to
communicate their intentions. This communications link does
not have to be a link in the technological sense, such as
the Washington to Moscow 'Hotline' known as MOLINK. It
could be a communication based upon agreed actions
signalling certain intent. For example, the crossing of
river will mean one thing, and the holding back of the
bombing of cities will mean another. Perception of intent
on the part of the enemy, and your own perceptions of expec-
tation are crucial to the concept of limited war [ Ref . 5].
These perceptions can be manipulated and the Soviets
actively attempt to exploit this aspect of command and
control through measures of reflexive control and disinfor-
mation. 4 According to Godson and Shultz, "This frequently
involves attempts to deceive the target and to distort the
targets perception of reality." [Ref. 6: p. 16]
Is nuclear war unique in this result? Is conventional
war thought of differently? Schelling states that most
people, even those who see no difference between being
4
Reflexive control is a Soviet notion of the indirect
implementation of control over an opponent by influencing
his decision making process, and advancing the implementor s
interests by predetermining his opponent's logical deci-
sions. It is via the methods and philosophy of reflexive
control that the Soviets employ deception. Disinformation
is a subset of reflexive control.
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burned to death in a nuclear fireball or by napalm, recog-
nize the revulsion of nuclear weapons. There is no
intrinsic difference; rather it is a matter of psychological
and intellectual distinction as well as an intuitive feeling
of what the adversary believes. By believing nuclear
weapons to be ' just-another-weapon' there exists no basis to
the limiting process. [ Ref . 5]
C. SUMMARY
Early U.S. nuclear strategy was known as 'Massive
Retaliation' and implied a prompt, total and massive
response with nuclear weapons to deter communist inspired
aggression wherever it might have occurred. Massive retali-
ation was thought to be a flawed policy because people
believed no President would order such a potentially devas-
tating reaction to communist adventures. They believed it
to be nothing more than a bluff. It was clear that the U. S.
required flexible strategies and capabilities to deter war
and aggression. Flexible response was an idea born in the
Kennedy administration that assurred destruction to aggres-
sors based on a response menu to fit the aggression. It
allows for an ability to pick options to fit the situation,
within the capability of the forces structured to respond to
a variety of conditions. If the response is nuclear, then,
flexible response means limiting nuclear war. Rather than
total, spasic war, a nuclear conflict would consist of
limited actions tailored to the particular situation.
Limited war is characterized by each opponent in the
conflict employing fewer resources than are available, and
restricting the political objectives of the conflict. By
comparison, unlimited war is characterized by the use of all
means available to each side in the conflict, and usually
has no well defined political objective, other than victory.
Much of the idea limiting war is dependent on the tradi-
tions and perceptions of the opponents with respect to the
21
limiting process and the conflict in general. Some mutual
recognition of the traditions and perceptions should exist.
Traditional non-use of nuclear weapons is presently a strong
constraint against nuclear first-use. Once that threshold
has been crossed though, subsequent nuclear-use may not have
such strong constraints. Perceptions of limiting war can
can be manipulated to one's advantage and the Soviet Union
engages in extensive active measures of reflexive control
and disinformation to change such perceptions. It must be
remembered that the ideas presented here are for the most
part Western in nature and this perspective represents only
a part of the overall conflict paradigm. Explicit Soviet
perspectives in the matter of limited war are extremely
important in analyzing conflict between our nations but is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Limited war is closely related to the concept of escala-




Control of escalation is the central element that is
unique in distinguishing limited war from, total war.
Escalation control is what keeps tension between two powers
from rising to the point of direct military confrontation.
Richard Smoke says of limited war and escalation:
Escalation is the process by which the previous limits
of a war are crossed and new ones established, (or. in
the end, the last limits crossed). Conversely, the
expanding limits of a war are the barriers or thresholds
or stages of the escalation process. From this point of
view, limited war and escalation are co-extensive:
neither is larger an idea, or encountered more
frequently in reality, than the other. [Ref. 7: p. 17]
According to Smoke, the term escalation did not appear in
dictionaries or scholarly literature until about 1960. This
was the time when many proflic thinkers such as Herman Kahn,
Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, William Kaufman, et al.
were developing what has become fundamental thinking on
nuclear war. Lawrence Freedman attributes the term to the
English in the 1950's and succinctly describes escalation as
"the intensification of any conflict." [Ref. l:p. 210]
During the 50' s and 60' s, two views of escalation devel-
oped. One view, a precursor of Schelling' s compellence
theory was of the raising of the stakes between belligerents
by a deliberate action resulting in heightened violence, or
by deliberately expanding the area of dispute. The whole
idea of compellence was to "compel" the adversary to change
his decision process or expectation of the outcome of
conflict, and to change it in such a way that his behavior
was that desired by the initiator. The other notion of
escalation was that of an increasing series, or continuum of
23
events in which the players were involuntarily caught and
swept along toward total war out of control [ Ref . 2: p. 4].
These two views of escalation are paralled and expanded by
Richard Smoke in his book "War: Controlling Escalation",
where escalation by a deliberate act he calls the "actor
image" model, and the continuous events type he calls the
"phenomenal image" model [Ref. 7: p. 21].' More will be said
about these two models later.
B. KAHN'S ESCALATION LADDER
Herman Kahn, in his books "On Escalation: Metaphors and
Scenarios", and "Thinking about the Unthinkable", proposed
in the early 1960 's a ladder of escalation steps through
which any conflict may proceed, culminating in nuclear war.
The steps represent a structure upon which to view escala-
tion phenomena. The steps provide no procedural informa-
tion, but are considered a classic attempt at discretizing
the escalation process of rising tensions between two
belligerents from a level of initial disagreement to general
war. From "Thinking about the Unthinkable" in 1962 the
first escalation ladder: [Ref. 8: p. 185]
1. Subcrisis Disagreement
2. Crisis
3. Political, Diplomatic and Economic Gestures
4. Show of Force
5. Modest Mobilization
6. Acts of Violence




11. Spectacular Show of Force
12. Controlled Local War
13. Limited Non-Local War
14. Complete Evacuation
15. Some Kind of Ail-Out War
16. Aftermath
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In 1965, Kahn expanded the idea of the escalation ladder
in his book: "On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios",
'adding resolution to the 16 step ladder and proposed a 44
step ladder that has been broken down into seven phases,
separated by nuclear threshold points or "firebreaks". The
crisis grows out of a noise level of some non-specific scen-
ario common to cold war disagreement: [ Ref . 9: p. 39]
The first phase is "Subcrisis Maneuvering"
1. Ostensible crisis
2. Political, economic and diplomatic gestures
3. Solemn and formal declarations
The first threshold to be crossed is "Don't Rock the Boat
Threshold" which moves the proto-crisis into the
"Traditional Crisis" phase.
4. Hardening of positions-confrontation of wills
5. Show of force
6. Significant mobilization
7. "Legal" harassment-retortions
8. Harassing acts of violence
9. Dramatic military confrontations
The "Nuclear War is Unthinkable" threshold is now
crossed, moving the crisis into the "Intense Crisis"
phase.
10. Provocative breaking off of diplomatic relations
11. Super-ready status
12. Large conventional war (or crisis)
13. Large compound escalation
14. Declaration of limited conventional war
15. Barely nuclear war
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16. Nuclear 'ultimatums'
17. Limited evacuation ( approimately 20%)
18. Spectacular show or demonstration of force
19. 'Justifiable' counterforce attack
20. 'Peaceful' worldwide embargo or blockade
The "No Nuclear Use" threshold has now been crossed
and we move into the "Bizarre Crisis" phase.
(Exemplary here to mean "warning")
21. Local nuclear "war-exemplary
22. Declaration of limited nuclear war
23. Local nuclear war-military
24. Unusual, provocative, and significant countermeasures
25. Evacuation ( approximately 70%)
The "Central Sanctuary" threshold is crossed next into
the "Exemplary Central Attacks" phase.
26. Demonstration attack on zone of interior
27. Exemplary attacks on military
28. Exemplary attacks against property
29. Exemplary attacks on population
30. Complete evacuation ( approximately 90%)
31. Reciprocal reprisals
Escalation at this point crosses the "Central War"
threshold moving the "Military Central Wars" phase.
32. Formal declaration of 'general' war
33. Slow- motion counter-
'
property ' war
34. Slow-motion counterforce war
35. Constrained force-reduction salvo
36. Constrained disarming attack
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37. Counterforce-with- avoidance attack
38. Unmodified counterforce attack
The "No Cities" philosophy is lost now and the "City
Targeting" threshold is crossed. This moves the conflict
into the "Civilian Central Wars" phase--the last.
39. Slow-motion countercity war
40. Countervalue salvo
41. Augmented disarming attack
42. Civilian devastation attack
43. Some other kinds of controlled general war
44. Spasm or insensate war
Kahn realized that' any escalation process is context
dependent and did not claim his ladders to be correct for
all circumstances. He also realized that his ladders
distinctly represented a Western point of view. In partic-
ular they ( 1 )de-emphasize the nature of the conflict leading
to war; (2) imply a control of movement up and down the
ladder with the possibility of stopping at any rung; (3)
focus at any one time on a single state of conflict and
thresholds, rather than the security threat, balance of
power, or accomplishment of objectives. This is the
bargaining or signalling approach to escalation and, though
known to the Soviets, is more a Western approach
[ Ref . 2: p. 5]. The fact that one nation views escalation
differently from another represents an asymmetry in the




Schelling distinguishes between the attainment of goals
directly in conflict and signalling, or actions directed at
bargaining. Because direct communication may not be
possible between belligerents, signalling would occur via
tacit actions, or moves. Schelling stated the need to
"coordinate expectations via maneuver", knowing that each
side must base its actions on what the other side is
expected to do. Salient points would be chosen and crossed
as actions to signal intent. Here each action would have to
be chosen ( supposing the other side would recognize it) as a
limiting maneuver and not an escalation. Otherwise, quite
naturally, the conflict would rise up the escalation ladder
instead of descending as the action intended.
The salient points or limits must be recognized by both
sides equally. And simple recognition of an escalation
point or saliency is not enough. For example, if one side
believes a nuclear strike existing of a single weapon on a
military base with the subsequent loss of say, 50,000 people
(including civilians due to collateral damage) as a limited
act used to signal resolve to the other side; but, the oppo-
nent considers it to be a prelude to all-out attack, then
the act and intent of limitation has been lost. Escalation
control then requires both sides to recognize specific acts
equally, that is to say, ground rules of some sort are
required, even if only tacit in nature. If not, the acts
must be of such a simple nature that they can only be inter-
preted in the way they were intended, otherwise all-out or
total war is at risk.
The term escalation is derived from the English infini-
tive "to scale" and the Latin word for ladder. It is a
back-formation of the word "escalator" [ Ref s. 7,10:
pp. 17,446]. The analogy is precise because the escalation
of conflict in limited war is the discrete, step-wise
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increase of tensions and actions leading to total war. The
requirement for discrete steps or thresholds is within the
framework of Kahn's escalaion ladder concept since any
single escalation must be finite to be recognizable to the
opponent as being within the framework of limitation. If
not, and a continuous sequence of actions takes place, then
there is no discernable point where the action can be recog-
nized as a limited move. And, again, the point of limita-
tion and escalation control is lost.
Richard Smoke, in "War: Controlling Escalation", uses a
model that is primarily characterized by defining escala-
tions as the crossings of saliencies. He attributes this
idea of saliecy crossing to Schelling. The saliencies are
the limits of the conflict perceptible to both parties.
Crossing or transcending a saliency is analogous to taking a
step up Kahn' s escalation ladder.
D. THE UPWARD DYNAMIC
Each saliency is discrete or discontinuous and the move-
ment is generally upward, that is, there tends to be an
upward dynamic to escalation as the conflict moves from one
saliency to another. 5 By nature ,war seems to favor escala-
tion. Because decision makers do not have perfect informa-
tion, the impact or interpretation of their decisions by the
adversary may not be correctly understood, thus creating
unforseen events or circumstances. There tends to be a
process where an action by one party is countered by the
other party, in sequential moves, creating an opened ended
cycle of escalation. This is what creates the upward
dynamic in the escalation process leading to total war.
Escalation is not a mere possibility-something that may
happen or may not, like a rainstorm over a battlefield.
It is an ever-present 'pressure or temptation or
The escalator analogy continues with each saliency
similiar to the discrete steps.
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likelihood, something that requires more deliberate
thought and action to stop and reverse than to start.
[Ref. 7: p. 35]
1. Two Western Models of Escalation
Smoke uses two " image" s of escalation that he joins
together into one model in his analysis of escalation:
(l)"The 'actor image' model presents escalation as being a
unilateral act of specifiable individuals and institutions;
an independent and conscious decision to commit a certain
kind of action and the deliberate execution of that deci-
sion. " (2) Complimenting the actor image model, the "phenom-
enal image" model presents escalation as being a natural
phenomenon of war, a process that seems to get started and
keep going on its own, partly outside the control of any
participant. In other words wars naturally tend to expand.
[Ref. 7: p. 21]
The actor image model implies an ongoing cognitive
process where the decision to escalate or not to escalate is
a descrete step--a decision to cross a saliency. It is a
model where someone does something, i. e. , someone takes some
purposeful action or makes a purposeful decision. The
phenomenal image model on the other hand, represents a
continuous process where something happens, beyond the
control of the decision maker who is swept along by the
force of the escalation which automatically tends to a
higher position naturally. The upward dynamic is somewhat
analogous to a falling object tending to a position of least
potential energy through the force of gravity.
Which model is correct? Neither the actor image nor
the phenomenal image model are complete and correct in them-
selves. Each tends to simplify the process. Instead, a
combination of the two should be the model for escalation.
That is, escalation has a dual nature, both discrete and
continuous, both are correct, neither is complete alone
[Ref. 7: p. 22].
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Is the upward dynamic tendendacy toward general war
analogous to the thermodynamic concept of entropy and the
tendancy to greater disorder and chaos? In physical
systems, unless the requisite work is performed on a system,
it will tend to a state of greater randomness or disorder.
Since society and conflicting states represent a system,
society may tend, through "social thermodynamics", to a more
disordered state during war. This disordered and random
state could then climax in total, uncontrolled war.
2. Six Elements of the Upward Dynamic
Smoke lists six elements in the escalation process
that reinforce the upward dynamic--the natural tendancy
toward uncontrolled or unlimited war.
1. The desire to take a step that will greatly contribute
to winning the war.
2. The desire not to lose.
3. Escalation of the stakes—the more I risk, the more I
pay, therefore the more it is essential that I win.
4. The psychological notion of leaders that their effec-
tiveness as national leader is contingent upon their
victory.
5. Opportunity exists for military advantage even though
it means escalation.
6. Action-reaction effect
These six elements can occur singly, or in any combination.
Any one can drive a conflict to uncontrolled total propor-
tions. The first five elements tend to be more descriptive
of a one-time event or period of time. For example, taking
an escalatory step that you believe will greatly contribute
to winning the war. The dropping of atomic weapons in Japan
certaintly falls into this category. It was the last esca-
latory step of WWII. The last element--the "action-
reaction" effect can characterize the entire escalation
process. [ Ref . 7: pp. 23-25]
3. Action-Reaction
Action-reaction occurs when one party counteresca-
lates in response to the other's escalation step. This may
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go on without apparent control to unlimited proportions
,
though not necessarily so. Smoke sees two types of action-
reaction effect escalation. The first he calls "reciprocal
escalation" [ Ref . 7: p. 27] which is a tit-for-tat process
that stops after two steps. This type of escalation,
constrained to two steps, then stopping implies a certain
stability between the two escalation steps. If the
stability is not there the escalation process would unlikely
stop at two steps. The other type of action- reaction effect
Smoke calls "cyclical-sequence escalation" [Ref. 7: p. 27].
This is a continuous escalation model and is different from
reciprocal escalation in that theoretically, it could go on
forever. Escalation is met with counterescalation, met with
counter-counter escalation, etc. The escalation process here
is "interactive", where the consequences of each escalation
interaction creates a new situation or state of conflict
which was probably unforseen by the belligerents. This
process may even be engaged in purposefully by decision
makers, not really understanding the possible outcomes, but
taking a chance on bumping the tensions up a notch and
hoping that chance and uncertainty are on your side. This
is what Schelling calls compellence. This type of escala-
tion may also be engaged in to take the opponent to the
"brink", where you calculate, and hope, that he will want to
bargain. This is known as brinksmanship 6 where the adver-
sary is forced into a position of uncertainty as to how far
you , the initiator of the escalation, will go. He is
forced to the brink of uncertainty and must be cautious for
fear of death or destruction. This also leads to the game
of 'chicken' where two adversarys drive toward each other in
a speeding car, the one to swerve first--loses. If neither
swerves--both lose. One of the most important strategies to
6
See Freedman p. 186-89 for additional information on
brinksmanship.
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remember when playing chicken is to convince your opponent
that you are stark raving mad, irrational, and intend to win
at all costs, such as by wearing a blindfold. Do you then
go to the brink with the madman, or do you negotiate?
Disaster results through miscalculation.
E. A BROADER VIEW ON ESCALATION
Escalation then is an ever increasing series of events
characterized by ever increasing scope and intensity; and,
these events are either part of a natural process of war
beyond the explicit control of the players; or a man-made
process where escalation occurs at discrete decision points
with implicit control. Crucial to the decision makers for
control of the escalation process is the mutual recognition
by both parties of the escalation events for what they are,
no more and no less. Asymmetries existing in culture,
forces, and doctrine play a crucial role. If an action is
misinterpreted, then, the escalation process tends to go out
of control and the limits of war have been breached. How do
the Soviets view escalation and limited war? Benjamin
Lambeth of the Rand Corporation sees 5 constant themes in
their strategic doctrine [ Ref . 2: p. 15].
1. The best deterrent is an effective warfighting capa-
bility *
2. Victory is possible
3. It pays to strike first
4. Restraint is foolhardy
5. Numbers matter
In contrast Lambeth attributes the following to NATO
doctrine [Ref. 2: pp. 15-16].
1. The best deterrent to large-scale Soviet aggression is
the threat of Massive Retaliation.
2. Concepts of military campaigns and victory are mean-
ingless on general nuclear war.
3. Preparing offensive campaigns (even counteroffensives)
is destabilizing-and to be avoided.
4. Restraint during NATO-Warsaw Pact war is essential.
5. Numbers mean less in the nuclear age.
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What is immediately apparent in reading these lists is
the asymmetry in the emphasis toward victory and maintaining
the initiative on the part of the Soviets, and the
idea--"Since there are no winners in a nuclear war, let's
limit the damage if deterrence fails"--for NATO. When does
the conventional battle escalate to nuclear proportions,
i. e. , when does deterrence fail? Knowing when deterrence
fails--that point in the escalation ladder and what to do
about the escalation process after it fails is something
that many people do not think much about. It seems that
most of our energies are placed into planning an effective
deterrence but little, if any planning is done to win a war
should deterrence fail.
1. A Soviet View
According to Davis and Stan at Rand, the Soviets
view war as conducted in phases rather than focusing on
escalation levels [ Ref . 2: p. 21]. These phases begin with a
"preparation "phase" where all forces and command and control
assets are mobilized, and by the forward deployment of
conventional forces. Next is the "conventional phase" with
the outbreak of war and a NATO invasion of the Warsaw Pact.
Also included in this phase is the use of conventional air
forces against Soviet strategic nuclear forces, conventional
war at sea, and anti-submarine warfare. The third phase is
the "transition to nuclear war". Because NATO forces are
losing the invasion effort, they begin small scale tactical
nuclear use in hope of regaining the initiative and
reversing the course of the war. While the theatre tactical
battle continues, the Soviets detect a NATO plan to initiate
full-scale theater nuclear weapons. The Soviets preempt at
this point with counter military, inter/intra continental
targeting. The United States then retaliates with intercon-
tinental and theater nuclear forces. A "follow-on" phase is
anticipated where protracted war will continue as necessary
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[ Ref . 2: p. 22]. This view is not strictly a limited war
view, but is in the sense that after the initial NATO inva-
sion, events incrementally increase in intensity to where
intercontinental nuclear weapons are used. How much
restraint and how much understanding of escalatory actions,
i.e., how much control, during the protracted aftermath will
determine whether or not the war remains limited.
2. A View from the West
The Western view predictably differs from the Soviet
view in two main areas: (1) The initial conflict begins
with a Soviet incursion into western Europe; and (2) Nuclear
weapons are used under strict command and control procedures
on an extremely limited scale to demonstrate resolve and the
will to 'go nuclear'. The Soviets do not speak of demon-
stration uses of nuclear weapons. Here lies another signif-
icant asymmetry in the escalation process. Remember, both
parties in the conflict must perceive the escalation equally
for the escalation to remain within the intended limits". If
we prescribe to the doctrine that nuclear weapons can be
used in a limited manner, for a demonstration of resolve,
and the Soviets see any limited use as a precursor to
all-out attack, then their option is to preempt and the
attempt to limit war by controlling the escalation has
failed.
Kahn describes escalation as a process set into
motion that may seem safe, and extensibly without serious
consequences, but in fact may be the beginning of a sequence
of disasterous decisions and actions.
One may readily imagine some intensifying crisis in
which neither side really believes the issue is big
enough to end in war, but in which both sides are
willing to accecpt some small risk of error. Escalation
might develop as a result of other parties becomming
involved, as a consequence of the issues taking on new
significance, or as a result of accident, miscalcula-
tion, unauthorized behavior, or other inadvertant cause.
Escalation can also be deliberate-as in the game of
chicken. [Ref. 8: p. 48]
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F. ESCALATION DOMINANCE
Escalation dominance is central to and derived from
Kahn's theory of escalation and is a function of existing
asymmetries of capability at any rung in the escalation
ladder. By definition, the side with escalation dominance
has the advantage or initiative at any step, where escala-
tion occurs, to control the movement of the conflict between
the states of war (rungs on the ladder). Freedman cites Kahn
on escalation dominance:
This is a capacity, other things being equal, to enable
the side possessing it to enjoy marked advantages in a
given region of the escalation ladder. ... It depends
on the net effect of the competing capabilities on the
rung being occupied, the estimate by each side of what
would happen if the confrontation moved to these other
rungs, and the means each side has to shift the confron-
tation to these other rungs. [ Ref . l:p. 218]
Having a little of the "madman" image helps to maintain
escalation dominance. Bertrand Russel said:
If one side is unwilling to risk global war, while the
other side is willing to risk it< the side which is
willing to run the risk will be victorious in all nego-
tiations and will ultimately reduce the other side to
complete impotence. [ Ref. 8J
A nation that possesses a requisite variety of forces with
which to meet any threat, that is, the proper balance of
forces to absorb the exhaustive variety of threats it may
meet, can freely execute escalation dominance over an adver-
sary not in possession of requisite variety.
G. SUMMARY
Escalation is the raising of the stakes in the game of
nuclear war. It is the intensification of actions and
violence by the single act of a decision maker, or by the
continuous force of events sweeping through the conflict.
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This intensification tends to have an upward dynamic leading
to all-out conflagration and total, unlimited war rather
than any downward tendency to de-escalation. Even mainte-
nance of the status quo, or a static tendency of stability
is absent. This upward dynamic can have many causes but
typically it involves the warring parties being overcome by
events. There is the win-at-all-costs mentality on the part
of policy makers that escalates war; action-reaction forces
such as tit-for-tat events; and cyclical-sequence escalation
where one party takes an action that creates a new situation
which must be responded to by the other party, which creates
a new situation which must be responded to by the first
party, etc. The mechanisms which are at work in the escala-
tion process work on man--the decision maker and the deci-
sion making process, his politics, and his forces, for it is





Three components of offensive forces make up the stra-
tegic nuclear arm of our military instrument of national
power. The three pronged "triad" consists of land based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); seabased subma-
rine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and long range
bomber aircraft—including air launched cruise missiles.
Essential to the triad is a nervous system linking it
together into an integrated system with central control at a
main control center—the brain of the operation. The nervous
system is a network of communications, people, procedures
and hardware otherwise known under the umbrella phrase
"Command, Control and Communications (C3)". This C3 system
consists of early warning ground based radars, orbiting
geosynchronous communications satellites, infra-red
detecting satellites, airborne command centers, hardened
underground command centers, soft command centers, communi-
cations links, computer systems, procedures, plans, decision
aids for the commanders—ultimately the National Command
Authority (NCA) consisting of the President of the United
States and the Secretary of Defense, and the people who make
the system work.
It is the mission of strategic command, control and
communications to provide attack information, strategic and
tactical, to the NCA along with intelligence information
expanding its assessment; to notify all other nuclear
commanders of attack warning/attack assessment (AW/AA) and
coordinate and direct any response back to the nuclear
forces from the NCA. See Figure 4.1 [ Ref . 11: p. 2] for a
general representation of the U. S. strategic command and
control relationships and operational connectivity.
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Figure 1.






NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM
• National Military Command Center
• Alternate National Military Command Center
• National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NUCLEAR FORCES COMMANDERS
• Strategic Air Command




• Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
• Ballistic Missile Submarines
Figure 4. 1 Strategic Command, Control and Communications.
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Concentration on the early strategies of massive retali-
ation and assured destruction has given way to much focus on
limited and flexible nuclear response options. These flex-
ible options which tailor the response of the decision maker
to the particular aggression put a great deal of emphasis
and importance on the command, control and communications
system. The C3 system must respond to the attack warning
accurately, i. e. , it must consistently give a positive
warning when there is in fact an attack in progress and just
as consistently not give spurious attack warnings; and it
must disseminate the attack information to all relevant
parties in a timely manner. The system muct be reliable,
survivable, flexible and able to rebound to a functionally
working state after degradation from severe stress. In
short, the C3 system must be robust. In its robustness it
must be able to accept a certain amount of variance in its
own execution, and variance in the environment and still
perform its function. Properties inherent in nuclear attack
and nuclear war cannot be entirely forseen. There is much
uncertainty and variance in the effects of nuclear
confrontation--apart from the obvious ones such as blast,
shock and prompt radiation. The C3 system must be expected
to perform robustly if limited war is to be kept limited and
if the United States intends not to lose a nuclear war.
Much strategic thought stops at the point where deter-
rence fails. If deterrence does fail and war escalates to
nuclear proportions without going to general war, then the
trans-attack period, once thought to last only minutes or a
few hours may actually last days, weeks or months in
protracted conflict. It is therefore of critical importance
that the nervous system of our strategic offensive forces
survives to control those forces through limitation and
final acceptable cessation of conflict.
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B. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
1. Control -Cybernetics
Control is the quintessential element in conflict
between opponents whether the opponents be in a conflict
system of sports, politics, economics, or, modern warfare.
What is meant to control forces and how is it done?
Following World War II a theory of control mecha-
nisms and related phenomena was developed by Norbert Wiener,
and expanded by W. R. Ashby, Stafford Beer, and others,
called 'cybernetics'. Simply put, cybernetics is the
theory of control processes of systems, where the systems
can be electrical, mechanical, biological, social, polit-
ical, or any combination thereof. Of course this list is
not exhaustive. Any activity that can be described as a
system that interacts with its environment can be modeled by
cybernetic relationships. Of cybernetics Stafford Beer
says,
Cybernetics is the science of control and
communications--wherever these occur in whatever kind of
system. The core of cybernetic research is the
discovery that there is a unity of natural law in the
way control must operate, whether the system is animate,
inaminate, physical, biological, social or economic.
[Ref. 12: p. 239]
Central to control theory and the cybernetic
approach is the flow of information through a system.
Cybernetics as applied to C3 theory is different from the
electro-mechanical engineering concepts of control where
energy input into the control system produces a propor-
tionate output response. In C3 systems the stimulus input
into the system and the commodity flowing through the system
is information. In terms of command and control, the infor-
mation content of any stimulus can have an enormous impact
on the system as a whole--often many times greater than the
intended response. This is a potential cause of losing
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control of limited war. Therefore, it is of critical impor-
tance that there is control of information flow through the
system as well as control of the system itself. Controling
the information flow aids in controlling the system.
2. The Cybernetic Paradigm
The basic cybernetic paradigm includes an object of
control and a controlling device, or, master control center.
Through channels of communication, the control center
affects the object of control in a way pre-determined by the
master control, much the way the brain—the control center-
manipulates the dexterity of the fingers— the controlled
object— in goal oriented behavior. A characteristic and
usually essential element, though not always, 7 of the cyber-
netic model is the inclusion of a feedback loop between the
master control and the controlled object. Feedback is
accomplished through some sensor system and an information
return loop. Behavioral information of a parameter of
interest is sensed and subsequently sent back through the
system to the control mechanism where that parameter's value
is compared the intended norm. If any deviation from the
norm is evident, the master control center generates and
signals an instruction to bring the outlying parameter back
to within controlled, normal limits. In other words, the
feedback loop conveys behavioral information of the
controlled object to the master control where the informa-
tion is examined to determine whether the object of control
is behaving within the limits of the intended behavior.
Cybernetics is important to command and control ( C2
)
theory since most C2 models are cybernetic variants. A
simple and effective command and control process model that
is cybernetic in nature and that will be used in this paper
is the work of Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Sr.
7 Cybernetic models of reflexive control have been demon-
strated without the inclusion of feedback loops
[ Ref . 13: p. 4].
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C. LAWSON'S COMMAND AND CONTROL MODEL
The Lawson process model consists of five basic func-
tions that constitute a C2 subsystem within an overall
conflict system. The functions are: (1) Sense, (2)
Process, (3) Compare, (4) Decide, (5) Act. These five func-
tions interact with the environment (or the other major
subsystem--the opponent) through a stimulus received by the
sense function; and through a response on the environment by
the act function. See Figure 4.2 for a depiction of this
model. [ Ref . 14]
The sense function is the receiving mechanism of the
stimulus into the C2 subsystem and conducts all data gath-
ering activity. Using sensor data and 'external' data from
inside the system, the process function acts on the informa-
tion gathered and begins the analysis, an activity which it
shares with the compare function. The compare function not
only takes the output of the process function and compares
whether the present state of the enviromnment is the state
desired by the decision maker or master control, it also
compares the present state to all states, past and future.
Together, the process and compare functions perform the
analysis for the subsystem in general and the decision maker
in particular. Based on the output of the compare function,
the decide function then determines, through internal deci-
sion aids, what must be done to change the environment (the
present state of the system) to the desired state. The
appropriate decision is then executed by the act function
directly on the environment. This command and control model
can be embedded into another of the same form resulting in
complex C2 processes. For example, each decision maker may
have many subordinates who have subordinates and each may
have a C2 system with the five functions working as a system
nested within a system and this can occur numerous times.












































span of control is then extended and effective control
becomes tenuous. This is a significant area to be studied
but will not be developed further here.
Lawsons's model is exceptionally simple and therein lies
its beauty. What is actually an extremely complicated
system of radars, satellite early warning sensors, scores of
data and intelligence analysts, thousands of communications
devices and computers, complicated algorithms for decision
making, command centers, and all the interlocking procedures
that tie them together into strategic command and control
can be simply represented by a few boxes connected by
arrows. Not included explicitly in Lawson' s model is a
planning function which may be equally important as the
other 5 functions. Little meaning can be made of control
without knowing what is to be controlled and how it is to be
controlled through planning.
D. SUMMARY
Tying together the U. S. nuclear forces is a complex
nervous system known generically as command, control and
communications ( C3 ) . It consists of sensor systems, commu-
nications devices, command centers, procedures and people.
The mission of strategic C3 is to sense an attack against
the United States accurately, not giving false alarms, and
to disseminate the attack characterization information to
appropriate command centers, principally the National
Command Authority (NCA), and the nuclear CINCS; to process
the attack information through analysis; and finally to
transmit and disseminate any decision action the NCA may
have made.
The command, control and communications systems must be
robust. That is, they must be able to perform satisfacto-
rily under conditions of nuclear war if effective control of
nuclear forces is expected. The nuclear environment of the
trans-attack and post-attack phases will be extremely
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stressful to C3 systems and if limiting nuclear war is
sought, requisite control must survive.
The cybernetic paradigm consists of a system acting on a
controlled object and is centered around a master control
center where decisions are made. It can consist of other
subsystems, as appropriate, to act on the environment.
There must be communication between the master control
center and the other subfunctions. Important to many cyber-
netic models is the inclusion of a feedback loop to convey
behavioral information of the controlled object back to the
control center to regulate responses in order to keep the
controlled object within intended limits. One important
cybernetic varient of command and control relationships is
the Lawson Process Model. Included are the 5 major func-
tions: (1) Sense, (2) Process, (3) Compare, (4) Decide, and
(5) Act. It can be argued that any C3 system will contain
these 5 functions. The strategic command and control system
of the United States is one of those C3 systems.
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V. THE WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
A. SENSE, PROCESS, COMPARE, DECIDE AND ACT--WWMCCS
The sense function of Lawson's command and control
process model is equated to the warning function for stra-
tegic command and control, since the sense function's
purpose is to use all systems, people, and procedures to
gather data from the environment. Sensor systems here would
be all the early warning detection devices and methods
employed to alert the National Command Authority (NCA) of a
tactical warning (attack in progress), or strategic warning
(attack probable and imminent), through the proper agencies,
people, and procedures. These warning systems include
radars based around the world and infra-red sensors in space
on constant surveillance that warn of the air-breathing and
intercontiental ballistic missile threat. Also included in
the sensor or warning function are the people and procedures
needed to collect the data and intelligence, and the commu-
nications hardware and procedures to pass the stimulus on to
the subsequent functions of the overall process. What is
required on a worldwide basis is constant, comprehensive
monitoring of the environment.
To determine the validity of an attack warning, the
Commander in Chief, NORAD initiates a series of emergency
action procedures (EAP) with the National Military Command
Center (NMCC) in Washington , the Strategic Air Command at
Offutt AFB, Neb. , and other nuclear commanders in charge
(CINCS). These procedures are highly classified and will
not be discussed here, but let us say thay are an institu-
tionalized system of checks and balances to prevent the
unauthorized, inadvertant use of nuclear weapons (negative
control) and to ensure the launch of nuclear forces when so
ordered by the National Command Authority (positive
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control). Once validity of the attack has been established,
the NCA is notified and the decision to release or not to
release must be made.
If the decision to respond is made by the President,
then a series of encrypted, preformatted 'go-code' emergency
action messages (EAM) will be transmitted via many communi-
cations media. Positive control--the ability to launch a
strike when ordered--is the main concern when the decision
to go nuclear is made. The transmitted EAM must get to the
various nuclear forces: the bombers on alert and in the air,
air refueling tankers, the missile launch facilities, and
the fleet ballistic missile force to scramble, or to launch
their weapons at targets decided upon by the NCA, or target
planners and contained in the EAM. An essential ingredient
of positive control is an assurrance or a belief with some
certainty that positive control is in fact present and the
forces will be launched. Once the EAM's have been received,
the 'two-man' rule is in effect, whereby a requirement for
at least two people to concur on the validity of the EAM and
work in concert in launching from separate work stations
within the launch control center. The problem of the recep-
tion of a valid EAM and the confirmation thereof is a
significant command and control problem. To perform' the
sense, process compare, decide, and act functions the United
States employs a vast array of strategic command, control
and communications systems. But these C3 systems cannot
function autonomously. They must be coordinated and
controlled through a central system-- something analogous to
the nervous system of the human body, that nervous system is
WWMCCS!
B. ELEMENTS OF WWMCCS
1. Background
The command and control process functions: Sense,
Process, Compare, Decide, and Act can be lumped into the
48
responsibility of the commander, his staff and the command
center. But since, the commander, his functions, his subor-
dinates and his command architecture is often distributed
and decentralized in execution, a nervous system controlling
the entire network is required.
As a result of a breakdown in communications between
command centers and operational forces, which seriously
contributed to a loss of control and the subsequent loss of
those forces in several international, crisis level inci-
dents in the 1960's, a need developed to design, field and
integrate a system that would would allow NCA control of all
national military resources. Beginning with the Cuban
missile crisis, the Kennedy administration realized that the
national decision making and execution capabilities were
suffering from a lack of command, control and communications
ability over its military forces, diplomatic centers and
other government agencies worldwide.
In 1962 Department of Defense directive 5100. 30
provided the first definition of the World Wide Military
Command And Control System--WWMCCS. But the development of
WWMCCS received little top-level direction [ Ref . 15: p. 60].
The sinking of the USS Liberty in 1967, the North Korean
seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968, and the shooting down,
again by the North Koreans, in 1969 of an EC- 121 electronic
intelligence aircraft dramatically pointed out that defi-
ciencies in WWMCCS existed.
These incidents, along with weak points found in the
the Minimum Essential Communication Network 8 spawned a
re-evaluation of WWMCCS. Under then Deputy Secretary of
State David Packard 9 and the Office of Assistant to the
Q
MEECN--the Minimum Essential Emergency Communication
Network are the necessary elements of WWMCCS to control
nuclear war and thought most likely to survive a nuclear
attack without strategic warning.
9
David Packard was Deputy Secretary of Defense from
1969-1972 and was a strong proponent of reviewing strategic
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Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications a WWMCCS council
was formed. It was the view of this effort that much more
focus must be placed on the strategic threat and the requi-
site control to maintain deterrence and control of forces if
deterrence fails. According to Blair, "Packard attempted to
rectify a decade of misplaced emphasis within the combat
commands and military departments by designating the
National Military Command System as the priority component
of WWMCCS. " Blair quotes Packard as saying, . . . " instead
of the local commanders now having as their first priority
to design their command system to meet the requirements of
their mission, they first have to have a design to meet the
requirements of the national command system." [ Ref . 3:
p. 57]
Department of defense directive 5100. 30, WWMCCS,
1971, revised the initial WWMCCS concept and provided a
definition of the National Command Authorities as consisting
of the President and the Secretary of Defense and their duly
appointed alternates or successors; defined the National
Military Command System as the primary component of the
WWMCCS, and its primary mission to support WWMCCS; desig-
nated the chairmnan, JCS as having overall responsibility
for WWMCCS; established the Assistant Secretary of Defense
as responsible for the WWMCCS within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; established a WWMCCS council; and
identified the command and control systems that constitute
the WWMCCS [Ref. 15: p. 61] .
The World Wide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS) includes all the hardware, software, personnel,
policies, procedures, communications systems, and command
centers, for the control of the U. S. military forces. The
C3I capabilities. He believed command and control deficien-
cies to be a serious problem with the greatest requirement
being for modernization of airborne command and control
[Ref. 3: p. 124].
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WWMCCS allows for the sensing of warning information, trans-
mission and integration of data and intelligence informa-
tion, transmission of administrative information enabling
the NCA to employ, and deploy forces of the military depart-
ments and provide direction to the unified and specified
commanders. Generally, WWMCCS stops at the tactical command
level. In short, WWMCCS is the vehicle for the operational
direction, and the management and administrative support of
U. S. military forces worldwide. It is through WWMCCS that
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the CINC's keep
their finger on the pulse of the national security environ-
ment. It is the nervous system for the sense, process,
compare, decide and act functions. WWMCCS has 6 functional
capabilities: (1) situational assessment, (2) tactical
warning, (3) briefing of the NCA and option selection, (4)
executing the selected option, (5) strike and damage assess-^
ment, (6) termination of a previously transmitted order.
[Ref. 16: p. 38].
2. The National Military Command System
The National Military Command System (NMCS) is the
primary component of WWMCCS and is the command node directly
below the NCA. The NMCS provides information on the status
of forces and the world situation to the NCA and is the
beginning of the conduit of command and control from the
President to the forces in the field.
a. National Military Command Center
The NMCS is headquartered at the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) located at the Pentagon. The
NMCC provides direct support to the president and operates
and maintains a direct communications link (DCL): the
Washington- to-Moscow teletype link (MOLINK), also known as
the 'Hotline'. The NMCC also supports the Secretary of
Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military
Command Center is a 24 hour operations center, manned by
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five watch teams who monitor crises, analyze world situ-
ations of national interest, advise the JCS, and provide
briefings to high-level decision makers [ Ref . 17: p. 67].
b. Alternate National Military Command Center
Since the Pentagon, and the NMCC would not
survive a nuclear strike launched against the nation 1 s
capital, an alternate command center exists about 80 miles
from Washington near Ft. Richie, Maryland. The Alternate
National Military Command Center (ANMCC), built deep inside
the Catoctin mountains is considered to be a moderately hard
[Ref. 3: p. 104] command facility with direct communications
to the NMCC at the Pentagon, and other military and defense
agency command centers. The ANMCC operates around-the-clock
and is intended to "mirror- image" the NMCC. In the event
the NMCC is no longer functioning, the ANMCC will assume
full operational control of the NMCS. Computer data bases
are constantly updated remotely by the NMCC, NORAD, SAC, and
other command centers. The ANMCC also has facilities for
the relocation of many VIP's and can operate in the
"button-up" mode for many days. The ANMCC, commonly
referred to as the 'Alternate', or as 'Site R' , beneath
millions of tons of rock notwithstanding, will not survive a
direct nuclear attack. Soviet weapons were much less accu-
rate when the ANMCC was built in the 1950' s. It was
designed to be hardened against a Soviet bomber attack but
those days are long gone. To overcome the dual vulner-
ability of the NMCC and the ANMCC, airborne command posts
make up the third component of the National Military Command
System.
c. National Emergency Airborne Command Post
The National Emergency Airborne Command Post
(NEACP), is probably the most survivable of all the National
Military Command System command posts and has the communica-
tions on-board to receive the threat warning from NORAD and
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to transmit the retaliatory commands to the nuclear forces--
but survival is not assurred in the nuclear age. Originally
NEACP forward operated out of Andrews Air Force Base,
Maryland, to provide the President and other VIP's access to
escape in the event of attack. With the shortened warning
time from the SLBM threat, NEACP moved forward operations
away from the coast to Grissom AFB, Indiana with primary
operations at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. This inland
move has provided NEACP precious extra minutes in escaping
certain destruction on the runway at Andrews where only 6-8
minutes warning time from the SLBM threat is commonly
expected.
NEACP presently consists of 4 E-4B aircraft
(modified Boing 747 airframes) and is the responsibility of
the Director of Operations, Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff [Ref. 17: p. 67]. The NEACP aircraft are capable of
assuming command and control of the NMCS if the NMCC and the
ANMCC are rendered inoperable. It is also intended to be
the airborne command post for the President or his successor
in the event of nuclear attack. The NEACP can issue the
order for release authority if the President or his
successor is onboard. x ° The E-4B is capable of a variety of
line of sight communications as well as low frequency (LF)
and very low ' frequency (VLF) communications via trailing-
wire antenna. In addition, each NEACP carries a satellite
communications terminal, is EMP hardened, 11 and accomodates
a battle staff of approximately 45 persons.
By law, only the President or his successor can direct
the release of nuclear weapons. The survival and location
of the President or his successor is therefore of extreme
strategic importance.
""Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is a sudden voltage spike
propagated through the atmosphere following nuclear explo-
sions and may cause damage to electronic equipment.
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The unified and specified commanders CINCPAC,
CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCSAC also have airborne command
posts. These aircraft, along with NEACP, and other relay
aircraft make up the World Wide Airborne Command Post
( WWABNCP )
.
3. WWMCCS Communications Systems
a. Defense Communications Agency
In May of 1960 the Defense Communications Agency
(DCA) was established as the overall manager of the Defense
Communications System (DCS). DCA was established primarily
to help solve the communications coordination problems
between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It had long been
recognized that a unification of service communications
toward interoperability and compatibility was needed but the
services were unable to agree to a workable plan. The
Defense Communications System was to be the primary network
providing long-haul, point-to-point communications from the
NCA on down to the unified and specified commanders, linking
together all military bases, functions, and command centers.
Excluded from the DCS were tactical communications; intra-
base communications, to include launch and firing complexes;
ship, land and airborne terminal broadcast facilities--
including ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore and ground- air-ground
systems. Along with communications channels, DCA provides
engineering and management support to NMCS command centers,
national emergency command posts, telecommunications facili-
ties, as well as automatic data processing (ADP) support
[ Ref . 3: p. 53]. The primary communication systems of the DCS
that support WWMCCS are AUTOVON, AUTODIN, AUTOSEVOCOM, and
DSCS.
(1) AUTOVON . The Automatic Voice Network
(AUTOVON) is the non-secure circuit switching network of the
Department of Defense. It is a highly redundant system with
many switching center nodes in the continental United States
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(CONUS) and in the European and Pacific theaters. This
system of switches forms a polygrid network that can claim a
certain amount of survivability through redundancy. These
switches are commercially leased in CONUS and are
government-owned overseas. AUTOVON also provides the
backbone to the narrow-band Automatic Secure Voice
Communications Network ( AUTOSEVOCOM) . AUTOSEVOCOM is the
long distance, encrypted voice communications system. All
AUTOVON traffic is official and is characterized as being
command and control, operations, intelligence, logistic,
diplomatic, or administrative [ Ref . 18: p. 41].
(2) AUTODIN . The Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN) is DoD's worldwide data and teletype network. It
is a secure record communications system that is also
redundant through many Automatic Switching Center (ASC)
nodes throughout the world. In 1982 DoD directed the
phase-out of AUTODIN to be replaced by the Defense Data
Network (DDN)-- an Advanced Research Projects Agency Network




Defense Satellite Communications System .
The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) is the
government and commercially owned satellite communication
system that supports the Department of Defense and other
government agencies. DSCS III satellites now operational
provide multichannel, jam resistant, EMP resistant secure
voice and high data rate communications for fixed as well as
mobile subscribers.
4. National Communications System
The National Communications System ( NCS ) is a
confederation of federal departments and agencies who
participate in providing their telecommunications assets to
the federal government for essential communications under
all conditions ranging from national disaster to nuclear
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war. Principally the assets of the NCS are composed of
organic systems of the Department of State, Defense,
Interior, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the U. S. Information Agency,
National Aeronautic and Space Administration, the General
Services Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency
[ Ref . 19: pi]. These assets come under NCS direction in
times of national crisis for emergency preparedness (EP).
The NCS owns no national level communications assets of its
own. The manager of the NCS is the director of the Defense
Communications Agency. See Figure 5.1 [Ref. 19].
The Defense Communications Agency and the National
Communications System are not specifically part of WWMCCS.
The NCS is the agency unifying the communications of the
federal government in times of emergency and DCA provides
planning, engineering and management support to WWMCCS.
Together, the Defense Communications • System and WWMCCS
provide the DoD contribution to the National Communications
System's emergency preparedness effort to provide reliable
communications at a national level to the National Command
Authority under all conditions from natural disasters to
nuclear war. [ Ref s. 15,19]
C. WWMCCS SUMMARY
The World Wide Military Command and Control System is
the primary vehicle for the operational direction, mana-
gerial control, and administrative support of the U. S. mili-
tary forces; therefore, WWMCCS is the primary system for
controlling U. S. strategic forces at the NCA level and is
the system that will be expected to support the President in
controlling escalation and limiting nuclear war. It is the
nervous system linking our forces together, providing the
backbone and stimulus connections for the "Sense, Process,
Compare, Decide and Act" command and control functions.




































Defense Comm Federal Telecomm Aeronautical and
stem - - -
r- System > Manne Networks
i i !
' mi
NASCOM Networks t DiplomaticTelecomm Service CIA Networks
.u uL^ipupj.. i ... i.'l" . — \jeaxa --- — »..; ji-i tw- i ,.^.^j.
;
ipi
USIA Dept of Energy Depl of the Intenor Dept. of Commerce
~ — "- ~- —












il i* hM^fcii hum i*
NOTES:
1. Policy Direction & Direct Execution of War Power Functions
2. Executive Agent NCS ResoonsiDilities Assignee to Secretary ot Defense Dy P'esioential Memorandum Aug 2t 1963
3. Director DCA Serves as Manager NCS
4. The Kev Communications Officials of the NCS Ooeraimg Agencies
5. First une Management Position wnich is exclusively NCS
6. National moustry Aovisory Committee to me FCC
7. National Telecommunications ano Information Aamtnistration
Figure 5. 1 The National Communications System.
57
and assure coordination capability for U. S. forces to appro-
priately respond to any attack; to maintain deterrence of
conflict between the U. S. and any adversary, and to provide
communications to adequately manage any crisis situation
that may develop throughout the world.
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VI. STRATEGIC COMMAND . CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
A. WARNING
In strategic C3 , the 'sense' function is called Attack
Warning and Attack Assessment (AW/AA). The (AW/AA) systems
detect inbound enemy missiles or aircraft and are the
responsibility of the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). Ground-based and space-based sensors
transmit launch data to the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex
(NCMC), Colorado. The NCMC is- the third U.S. hardened
underground command center. 12 It consists of 15 steel build-
ings mounted on anti- shock springs, built inside a mountain
near Colorado Springs, Co. When a missile is detected,
Cheyenne Mountain contacts other sensor sites worldwide to
determine the validity of the detection. Confirmation of
the attack must come from at least two independent warning
sensor systems. This confirmational requirement by two
sources is known as 'dual phenomenology' and usually
invloves a positive tracking by ground-based radar r and the
identification of the missile's hot exhaust plumes by spaced
based infra-red sensitive satellites. After analysis and
verification, NORAD passes the tracking status on to the
NMCC and other nuclear CINC's. The NMCC begins a missile
display conference with NORAD and SAC command posts. NORAD
then confirms or denies the attack as real and imminent
[Ref. 17].
x The Cheyenne Mt. complex was- preceeded by the ANMCC
and the Federal Emergency Magement Agency ( FEMA) special
facility.
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1. The Air-Breathing Threat
a. The Distant Early Warning Line
The first sensors used to detect the air-
breathing bomber aircraft threat, known as the Distant Early
Warning line (DEW), initially consisted of a network of
radars strung about 3,000 miles across northern Canada from
Greenland to Alaska along the arctic circle. The DEW line
though, has become old and outdated since it first became
operational in 1957. It suffers from a serious lack of
effective coverage of low flying penetrators. The DEW line
is planned for augmentation and eventual replacement in the
1990' s by the over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar
system known as North Warning. North Warning will consist
of 52 General Electric FPS-117 radars which will be mini-
mally manned or totally unattended [ Ref . 17,15].
b. The Joint Surveillance System
The SAGE 13 network has been replaced by the
Joint Surveillance System (JSS) which is shared with the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and consists of 47
radar sites including seven Region Operation Control Centers
(ROCC). The JSS provides air traffic data to both the FAA
and the ROCC's and covers a range out to about 200 miles
around the continental United States. These sites are
connected with the Alaskan Seek Igloo and Canadian radar
sites. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
also augment the system by supplying low-level "gap"
coverage.
To respond to the air-breathing threat, NORAD
has 31 alert sites: 15 fighter squadrons with two fighters
at each on constant alert. This force can be augmented if
necessary by other Air Force, Navy, Marine, Air Force
1
-J
Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) was the first
warning and control system of the nuclear age. At its
development, SAGE was the largest data base processing
system in existence and was used to coordinate fighters and
missiles with attack-warning information [Ref. 21: p. 11].
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Reserve, Air National Guard, and Canadian fighter aircraft.
[Refs. 17,20]
2. Missile Warning Threat
For the non air-breathing threat, NORAD employs six
ground-based radar systems and a space-based infra-red
sensing satellite system: (1) Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS), (2) Pave Paws, (3) the AN/FPS-85
radar, (4) the AN/FSS-7 radar, (5) Perimeter Acquisition
Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS), (6) Cobra Dane
and (7) the Defense Support Program. The ground based
sensor systems will detect a missile launch very shortly
after they are first detected by space based assets. These
sensor systems provide confirmation of launch attack parame-
ters and impact location predictions.
a. BMEWS
The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
located at three sites: Thule Air Base, Greenland; Clear Air
Force Station, Alaska; and Fylingsdales, United Kingdom,
transmits ballistic missile tactical attack data via high-
speed circuits dependent on commercial carriers
[ Ref . 21: p. 217] to NORAD where the information is forwarded
on to other comand centers [Ref. 17: p. 66].
b. PAVE PAWS
Two phased-array PAVE PAWS radars, one located
at Otis AFB, Mass. and the other at Beale AFB, Ca. provide
wide coverage with their electronically steerable antennas
and can track hundreds of targets simutaneously out to a
range of 3000 miles. PAVE PAWS data consists of object
identification, launch time, impact time, and impact loca-
tion primarily for submarine launched ballistic misiles
(SLBM). [Ref. 17: p. 66]
c. AN/FPS-85 AN/FSS-7
Also targeted against the SLBM threat is the
AN/FPS-85 SPACETRACK radar located at Eglin AFB, Fl. The
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AN/FPS-85 will be our only south- looking phased- array radar
until two new PAVE PAWS come on line at Robins AFB, Ga. and
Goodfellow AFB, TX. The AN/FSS-7 mechanical radar located
at McDill AFB, Fl. also looks south and is an SLBM threat
radar. [ Ref . 17: p. 66]
d. PARCS
Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System (PARCS), originally part of the
Army's Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, provides
SLBM warning for Soviet arctic launches behind BMEWS
coverage as well as ICBM warning from conventional Soviet
launch points [ Ref. 17] .
e. Cobra Dane
Located at Shemya, Alaska at the tip of the
Aleutian Chain is Cobra Dane, a phased array radar. Cobra
Dane routinely monitors Soviet ballistic missile tests. It
too has attack characterization capability and communicates
directly with NORAD. [Ref. 17] See Figure 6.1
[Ref. 11: p. 9]. for land based ballistic missile warning
sites and detection sweeps
f. The Defense Support Program
The Department of Defense employs a system of
infra-red sensing satellites for early warning of ICBM and
SLBM attack --the Defense Support Program (DSP). Three
satellites are reported to exist covering the Sino/Soviet
mainland looking for ICBM launches, and over the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans looking for SLBM launches. The DSP satel-
lites pick up the infra-red signatures of the hot exhaust
plumes of ballistic missiles while they are in boost phase,
within about 30 seconds of liftoff. Data from the satellite
system is down-linked through sites in Australia and
Colorado and on to NORAD. Because of the time-urgent nature
of the data, SAC command center and the NMCC receive the
warning data simultaneously. [ Ref s. 3,21: p. 36, pp. 141-44]
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INDIAN OCEAN
SOURCE: Compiled by the Congressional Budget Office from unclassified sources.
Figure 6. 1 Missile Warning Sites and Detection Sweeps.
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B. RESPONSE--SYSTEMS FOR THE ACT FUNCTION
Once the attack characterization information has been
processed and analyzed, and a decision to act has been made,
the response or 'act' function follows. The systems for
disseminating the decision order, i.e., the Emergency Action
Message (EAM) for strategic forces ares
1. PACCS
The Post Attack Command and Control system (PACCS)
is the airborne command and control system of the Strategic
Air Command and is focused primarily around the airborne
alternate of SAC's command center; called 'Looking Glass',
since it's supposed to mirror-image Strategic Air Command's
semi-hardened command post at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. The
airborne SAC command post flys in EC-135 aircraft, and has
been in the air constantly since 1961. The Looking Glass
command post also has launch capability in the case of
destruction to ground launch control facilities.
2. PAS
The system of dedicated landlines for voice communi-
cations between command centers and launch control centers
is known as the Primary Alerting System (PAS). The PAS
links SAC headquarters together with approximately 200 sites
around the world.
3. IEMATS
The Improved Emergency Message Automatic
Transmission System ( IEMATS) uses AUTODIN connectivity and
automatic switching centers to transmit the EAM go-codes.
4. JCSAN
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network allows
non-secure voice conferencing between the NMCC, the Joint
Chiefs and the CINCS.
5. Giant Talk
Giant Talk is a Strategic Air Command long distance,
surface-to-air high frequency (HF) communications system
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that provides connectivity between CINCSAC and the airborne
nuclear forces.
6. Green Pine
Green Pine is a ultra high frequency (UHF), line of
sight (approximately 200 miles) communication system used in
the arctic regions where high frequency (HF) communications
can suffer serious signal degredation. The system of ground
based sites extends from Alaska to Iceland. Again, like
Giant Talk, Green Pine provides CINCSAC positive control
over its airborne nuclear forces. [ Ref . 3: p. 104]
7. ERCS
The Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS) is
a "last chance" method to disseminate the emergency action
message to the nuclear forces. Housed inside a Minuteman
missile is a UHF radio with a taped execution message. If
the EAM cannot be transmitted via other means, the ERCS
missile will be launched on a trajectory over CONUS and any
launch control center within line-of-sight range will
receive the go code message. ERCS will be used only if
other communications systems are not available.
8. SLFCS
The Survivable Low Frequency Communications System
(SLFCS) is a LF/VLF teletype system connected to launch
centers, base wing command posts, Green Pine facilities, SAC
airborne command posts (Looking Glass) and NEACP. Since
LF/VLF depends on ground wave propagation of its signal, it
is not succeptable to serious degradation from nuclear
effects on the atmosphere, SLFCS is expected to have trans-
attack and post-attack communications capability
[Ref. 3: p. 164].
9. SACCS
The SAC Automatic Command and Control System (SACCS)
is the high-speed data transmission system linking together
all SAC command posts. It is an automated system for trans-
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mitting alert and execution messages, and is being upgraded
as the SAC Digital Network (SACDIN).
10. AFSATCOM
The Air Force Satellite Communications system
(AFSATCOM) became operational in 1979 and was designed
specifically for strategic C3. AFSATCOM operates in the UHF
band and consists of transponders on Navy FLEETSATCOM satel-
lites, Satellite Data System satellites and other classified
systems. Terminals are located at major military installa-
tions, on E-4B, EC-135, EC-130, and B-52 aircraft, and at
Minuteman Launch Control Centers.
11. SBS
The Submarine Broadcast System (SBS) is a LF/VLF
network of transmitters at ground stations and on airborne
platforms throughout the world. Since high frequency radio
signals are severly attenuated by sea water, low frequency
communications systems are used to communicate to the
nuclear submarine forces. The system of relay aircraft for
transmitting EAMs to nuclear missile submarines ( SSBN) at
sea are modified C-130's called TACAMO (Take Charge and Move
Out).
The Navy's extremely low frequency communications
system, known as ELF, hampered since the early 1970' s by
environmentalists and political opponents is finally
reaching the latter stages of full-scale development, with
initial operationl capability planned for the summer of
1986. The ELF system will allow continuous communications
with submerged submarines without the necessity of requiring
the submarines to surface. The extremely low frequency
signals (40-80 Hz) resonate within the earth-ionospheric
cavity, thus the signal will have very long range propaga-
tion. The data rate will be very low, but continuous stra-
tegic communications without endangering the SSBN's will be




Milstar will be the next generation of military
satellite communications scheduled to be deployed in the
early 1990' s. Milstar will operate in the EHF spectrum and
will be less susceptible to nuclear effects from high alti-
tude bursts. It will serve the tactical and strategic
communities in worldwide, jam resistant survivable communi-
cations. Especially important will be Milstar' s capability
to provide direct, secure voice channels connecting NEACP
and the CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, and CINCEUR airborne
command posts--WABBNCP--for EHF conferencing during trans-
attack and post-attack periods [ Ref . 3].
2. GWEN
The Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) is a system
of low frequency radio sites that will connect sensor sites
such as PAVE PAWS to NORAD, SAC HQ, and ICBM Launch Control
Centers (LCC). GWEN is to be EMP hardend but is susceptible
to blast and shock effects. Therefore, GWEN will be useful
as a tool to get the message out before the first nuclear
weapons fall, i. ,e. , its importance is in providing attack
information to command posts and aircraft before the GWEN
sites themselves are destroyed. The utility of the system
lies in the few minutes of communications it will provide
between the onset of the EMP effects of high altitude bursts
from SLBM's and jamming, and the time of impact of ICBM's
See figure 6.2 [Ref. 3: p. 254].
3. IONDS
The Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System
( IONDS) will be the space-based sensor package for the
detection and precise location of nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere and in space. Expected to be on 18 NAVSTAR navi-
gation satellites by 1988, IONDS will provide real-time







[ Ref . 3: p. 261]. Equipped with visible light sensors, X-ray
and EMP sensors, the IONDS spacecraft will identify nuclear
detonations on U. S. territory as well as in the Soviet Union
and will have the capacity to transmit this data directly to
airborne command posts such as NEACP, Looking Glass, etc.
This system will be crucial for attack characterization and
decision making for controlling any nuclear response. In
the event of nuclear attack, with precise data from IONDS,
the President will be better able to decide to launch our
nuclear forces or to hold them back for later use or
bargaining.
D. SUMMARY
To control escalation and limit nuclear war, the NCA
must have a command and control system that exercises the
functions necessary to sense the environment, to decide on a
response appropriate to the environment, and to execute that
response, or act on the environment. The sense function of
U. S. command, control and communications is known as Attack
Warning and Attack Assessment (AW/AA) and is carried out by
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD
is primarily located beneath a mountain near Colorado
Springs, Colorado. NORAD AW/AA systems sense a missile
launch or detect bombers in flight and transmit the informa-
tion to the NCA and the nuclear CINCS. Detection systems
can conviently be separated into those looking at the air-
breathing threat--bombers; and those looking for the non
air-breathing threat--missiles.
To detect the air-breathers, the U. S. has the Distant
Early Warning (DEW) line and the Joint Surveillance System
(JSS). The DEW line, a network of radars strung from
Greenland to Alaska across Canada is being replaced by the
North Warning system. The JSS has replaced the old SAGE
system and is shared between NORAD and the FAA. JSS
provides the FAA and the Regional Operation Control Centers
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air traffic information out to about 200 miles from the
coast of the continental United States.
To detect the non air-breathing threat NORAD employs six
ground-based radar systems and a space based infra-red
sensing system. The ground-based radars are: (1) BMEWS, (2)
PAVE PAWS, (3) AN/FPS-85 phased-array radar, (4) AN/FSS-7
radar, (5) PARCS, and (6) Cobra Dane. The DSP satellites
make up the space-based system.
In order to respond to an attack, an Emergency Action
Message (EAM) or go code message must be transmitted to the
nuclear forces. The strategic systems for transmitting such
a message, and for high-level conferencing are: (1) PACCS,
(2) PAS, (3) IEMATS, (4) JCSAN, (5) Giant Talk, (6) Green
Pine, (7) ERCS, (8) SLFCS, (9) AFSATCOM, and (10) SBS. New
systems are GWEN, Milstar, and I0NDS.
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VII. FIVE SCENARIOS FOR NUCLEAR WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
Under what conditions or scenarios would a nuclear war
begin that could be be limited in nature? In his book,
"Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980' s", Herman Kahn
outlines five canonical scenarios developed by the Hudson
Institute to help think about the beginning of World War
III. If these 5 scenarios are assumed plausible, they can
be used as a backdrop for looking at our command and control
process of strategic battle management and the concepts of
limited war and escalation control. Unfortunately we do not
have 5 command and control systems with one to specifically
deal with each scenario. Instead we have one overall system
that is expected to be flexible, survivable and endurable.
It is with these qualities of the command and control
process that war will remain limited or protracted at a low
level of intensity and be constrained from escalating to
unimaginable general nuclear war.
It is important to remember that Western views of
limited war, escalation, and the very nature of war itself
may be significantly different from Soviet views. If so,
this asymmetry existing between Eastern and Western culture
and their views on the concept of conflict is itself an
important contributor to the control of escalation, but
enumeration of Soviet views on this subject is beyond the
scope of this thesis. It is with this caveat that the 5
scenarios of possible beginnings to nuclear war are
presented.
B. KAHN'S 5 SCENARIOS
Herman Kahn's 5, "not implausible", scenarios are: (1)
Surprise Nuclear Attack, (2)Early Eruption to Nuclear War
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from an Intense Crisis, (3) U.S. First Strike to Defend
Western Europe, (4) Escalation to Nuclear War from a
Protracted Crisis, (5) Escalation to Nuclear War from a
Mobilization War.
1. Surprise Nuclear Attack
Surprise nuclear attack, commonly thought of as a
'Bolt out-of-the Blue', is probably the least likely of all
possible beginnings to nuclear war. Motivation for such a
surprise attack must be questioned. Why would the Soviets
risk war and almost certain destruction by suddenly striking
without provocation. Certaintly there seem to be other,
less risky ways to obtain political and economic objectives.
What form would the attack take? Would the Soviets demand
total capitulation? If for some reason they did, a
constrained attack would seem counter-productive. Total
capitulation would call for an all out attempt to destroy
the enemy. One does not politely 'sucker-punch' an oppo-
nent. You hit him- hard with all you have got to take 'him
out swiftly. That is the reason for such action in the
first place. Anything but an all out unconstrained counter-
force first strike attack would lead to certain counter
attack by the U. S. Of course it can be argued that by
constraining the first strike the follow-on retaliation by
the U. S. would also be constrained, or possibly not come at
all. The reasoning follows: If the Soviet Union is very
careful in its targeting and hits only counterforce targets
and command and control centers and minimizes collateral
damage to the civilian poulation, the U.S. (recognition of
limited intent here is crucial) may choose to strike back
only at counterforce targets, or because of its degraded
force may not strike back at all, .since its command and
control and damage assessment capabilities would be far
below operational certainty. Without the proper command and
control to direct the forces and without the requisite
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damage assessment to know what forces still exist and are
operational and what targets are viable, any counter strike
may be better left for later when control and coordination
are reconstituted. Any spasm counterstrike against Soviet
cities would only be followed by countervalue strikes
against U. S. cities. But any president, for political,
diplomatic and psychological reasons would have to respond
in some way.
An effective surprise nuclear attack could involve a
decapitation strike against the National Command Authority
(NCA), and the major command and control centers such as the
NMCC, the ANMCC, NORAD, SAC command posts, and the FEMA
special facility; with follow-on, or simultaneous strikes
against major communications nodes such as telephone
switching centers, satellite ground stations, AUTOVON and
AUTODIN switches, early warning radar centers and VLF
stations. The decapitation of the brain from the body of
the decision making process--the NCA-- combined with the
loss of major command, contol and communications ' nodes,
would seriously paralyze any reprisal action contemplated
without even attacking the SIOP 14 forces themselves. This
would hardly seem like a limited attack since separating
these targets from the civilian population would be impos-
sible. But it is a limited scenario, when compared with a
countervalue attack against American cities where possibly
as many as 200 million casualties can be expected from
prompt and long-term effects.
2. Early Eruption of Nuclear War from an Intense Crisis
Nuclear war erupting early from an intense crisis
would probably come from one of four situations: (1)
Uprising in Eastern Europe with NATO involvement, (2) Soviet
military intervention in the Persian Gulf with U. S. counter
14 The Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) is the
U. S. nuclear attack plan.
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intervention, (3) Sino/ Soviet war with the U.S. allying
itself with China, (4) other East Asian conflicts.
[ Ref . 23: p. 135] These are examples of what could actually be
an endless list of possible crisis scenarios leading to
first use of nuclear weapons. One common thread that runs
through them all is the resort to nuclear use to either
prevent a conventional military loss, or to prevent loss of
political control by redirecting the emphasis of the
conflict. If a conventional military crisis in Europe were
being lost by NATO, the U. S. may strike first with tactical
nuclear weapons at supply lines and command centers in
Eastern Europe. Or, nuclear weapons may be used in the
Persian Gulf if oil fields were threatened there by the
Soviets; or, an attack on Cuba may be used to draw attention
away from a European theatre crisis, or just to threaten
Soviet security interests. This lateral initiation of
events is called "horizontal escalation." [Ref. 23: p. 135]
During an intense crisis in the nuclear age, the
decision makers at the NCA level must consider nuclear
release. It is always a possibility in the extended or
severe crisis and the uncertain dynamics of nuclear war
requires realistic thinking. The master control center—
the NCA--must consider whether to 'go nuclear' is less
dangerous than to not 'go nuclear. ' Moral issues aside, it
must be considered whether to strike first is safer then to
not strike first. Obviously any first strike is a signifi-
cant escalation, and escalation to nuclear war is what is
being avoided, but, if nuclear war is inevitable, use must
be considered. A partially or wholly disarming attack would
be better to inflict than to receive, and the one who
attacks first has a certain advantage. It could be argued
that to control nuclear war, one must resort to nuclear war.
But, as cited by Kahn, Bismarck said, "Preventive war is
like commiting suicide for fear of death." [Ref. 23: p. 136]
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A demonstration use of nuclear weapons has to be
considered in this scenario. If either side wanted to
demonstrate will and resolve in the seriousness of the situ-
ation, 'shooting across the bow' of the opponent is an
option, albeit a dangerous one. This act would demonstrate
to the opponent that the situation was serious enough to
demonstrate a show of force with the formally taboo use of
nuclear weapons. The objective would be to slow the upward
dynamic and limit the crisis to any further escalation.
This is extremely risky though, since the opponent must
recognize the demonstration show of force precisely as a
demonstration and the opponent must also then be unwilling
to up the ante. Escalating to control escalation through
first use of nuclear weapons as a demonstration is frought
with uncertainty and could lead to total loss of control of
escalation. On the other hand, it may give the practitioner
escalation dominance by rising the state of the conflict to
a step on the escalation ladder where the opponent is either
not able or unwilling to go, or remain; hence, compelling
him to deescalate.
3. Defense of Western Europe
A U. S. nuclear fist strike to defend Western Europe
is the way most people envisage the beginning of a nuclear
World War III. This scenario begins with a Soviet attack on
Western Europe for unspecified reasons, usually with Warsaw
Pact forces--East German, Polish, etc. Since NATO is not as
prepared for conventional war as the Warsaw Pact forces, the
Red thrust is successful and pushes the NATO forces back.
Rather than lose Western Europe to the Soviets, tactical
nuclear weapons are used to signal resolve and seriousness.
If this message fails, tactical nuclear weapons are used on
advancing Red forces and rear echelons. To effectively
destroy the rear echelons and support forces, attacks would
have to be made against targets in the Soviet Union. This
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would call for the use of intermediate range ballistic
missiles ( IRBM) and Soviet IRBM's could be targeted. This
is a major escalation and probably the Soviets would respond
with at least IRBM attacks against major NATO military
installations and cities and CONUS. A corollary to this
hypothesis: after the Soviets invade Western Europe, they
sense desperation on the part of NATO and preempt any plans
of nuclear first use NATO may have.
Any attack on NATO by the Warsaw Pact would probably
be responded to early with nuclear weapons, if at all,
because to hold off would mean that the weapons would have
to be used to slow the advancing Red forces on the very
ground being protected. It hardly seems that the West
Germans would understand the destruction of their homeland
with nuclear weapons as a measure to protect it.
4. Escalation to Nuclear War from a Protracted Crisis
Any protracted crisis becomes a very dangerous situ-
ation in the nuclear age. Nuclear war could potentially
erupt for many reasons, but the reason of interest here is
that any protracted crisis implies that strategic forces for
both nations would probably be on an increased alert status
for extended periods of time. This protracted alert status
presents special problems and pressures for man and machines
and for the system that ties them together. Systems fail
under the best of conditions, and the stress of crises
demand more than just additional vigilance and increased
channel capacity. Crisis situations have the tendency to
support Murphy's Law, and it is the uncertainties of crisis
and the uncertainties in supporting command and control
processes during crisis situations that will require the
system to perform in ways that it may not have been designed
to perform, and will severely stress the system. During the
protracted crisis many maneuvering tactics may be employed
by both sides to convince the opponent to back down. This
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could be the time for taking the opponent to the brink, or
for playing 'chicken'. In any case, both sides must recog-
nize the actions of the opponent if escalation is to be
controlled. Miscalculation during a period of protracted
crisis and extended alert status could set the mechanism in
motion toward a cascade of events all leading to uncont-
rolled, unlimited war.
5. Escalation to Nuclear War from a Mobilization War
The last of Kahn's five scenarios: Nuclear war
beginning as a result of the mobilization process of
opposing nations is probably the most likely of the five.
Mobilization is the increased activity of a nation preparing
for war. It involves the transfer and conversion of peace-
time industrial and civilian power to wartime military
power. It is commonly suggested that World War I began as a
result of mobilization slipping beyond control of the
players. Bracken says, "What set off the interlocking
alerts of the European armies in 1914 was not the isolated
assassination of the archduke in Sarajevo, but the decision
to mobilize." [ Ref . 21: p. 53] If mobilization does not lead
directly to war then it will probably at least change the
strategic balance. Kahn believed that a competition of
mobilization between the U. S. and the Soviet Union would
give the United States a dominant strategic advantage
[Ref. 23: P. 145] . Given these five or any other plausible
scenario leading to nuclear war, there must be some require-
ments necessary which must be filled in order to keep any
confrontation limited.
C. SUMMARY
The idea of nuclear war conjures many dark questions
that are difficult to answer for many reasons. So much
uncertainty exists around nuclear war, much of it thanks to
the fact that one has never been fought. Another source of
uncertainty centers around the exact circumstances around
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which the war begins. Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute
suggested 5 most probable scenarios of interest for the
beginning of war between the Soviet Union and the United
States. There is no certainty that war will in fact result
from one presented. The five scenarios again are: (1)
Surprise nuclear attack, (2) Early eruption of nuclear war
from an intense crisis, (3) Defense of Western Europe, (4)
Escalation to nuclear war from a protracted crisis, (5)
Escalation to nuclear war from a mobilization war.
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VIII. REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITED WAR
Stafford Beer says that the science of control is cyber-
netics and the profession of contol is management. For
those whose job it is to conduct nuclear war, their profes-
sion is management of nuclear forces, or strategic battle
management. According to Paul Bracken, "Deterrence, second
strike capability, and limited nuclear war are logical
concepts but are incomplete. The job of management and
command and control is to turn these concepts into actu-
ality. ..." [Ref. 21: p. 238]
Limiting war to a final and favorable conclusion is the
goal of strategic battle management and this is obtained
through the control of escalation. The technological appa-
ratus for waging nuclear war though, is a vastly complex
system, replete with uncertainties as to its control effec-
tiveness. With this in mind we may ask: What are the
elements that a nation must possess to limit war? What
effect will the trans-attack and the post-attack environment
have on our C3I systems? Does our C3I system support battle
management of protracted nuclear war?
A limited war requires deterrence and control by the
major decision makers before the actual confrontation begins
and during intra-war, and post-attack environments. But
deterrence and control mean much more than just convincing
the enemy that his destruction is in fact assurred if he
attacks or escalates. He must also be convinced that the
second strike capability of his opponent, that is, the stra-
tegic forces, can be managed, controled, organized and coor-
dinated into an effective fighting force. The dynamics of
escalation have become of major interest to strategists and
the increased command and control capabilities of strategic
forces is seen as a prerequisite to force effectiveness and
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escalation control, and to some, a co-equal to the nuclear
forces themselves.
The list of requirements to effectively limit nuclear
war could be long and varied depending on the context
framing the objectives of the war. This chapter will look
at some requirements to keep limited war limited, and
discuss some C3 implications of the limited war concept.
Offered are some elements I feel necessary for limitation,
but do not imply that the list is exhaustive. Some of the
required elements overlap and they are presented in no
particular order of importance. Priority would be deter-
mined to a large extent by the exigencies of the particular
crisis situation and would; therefore, be scenario specific.
A. VIABLE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
For a quick kill, to destroy the body, one must attack
the head. Once the brain, or the master control center is
destroyed--the body soon follows. An attack on the brain of
the command and control structure—the NCA--before it is
able to perform its decide and act function and transmit an
order for retaliation is known as "decapitation". To effec-
tively neutralize the strategic forces of any nation, an
attack at the top of the decision making process creates a
situation of confusion and impotance. To help ensure the
survival of the NCA various mechanisms exist. Most of the
details are highly classified and no attempt will be made
here to outline the procedures. However, it can be said
that: (1) the President, given adaquate early warning of an
ICBM launch, could escape on NEACP, or rendevous with NEACP
later if warning time did not allow airborne escape from the
Soviet Yankee class SLBM threat; (2) if the President did
not survive an attack on Washington, measures for the devo-
lution of authority for the release of nuclear weapons
exist. Given any scenario for the beginning of nuclear war,
other than no attempt at NCA decapitation, the President
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would probably not make the helicopter ride to Andrews AFB
to escape on NEACP. Assumming that all emergency procedures
worked as planned, without delay, the ride from the White
House to Andrews is 8 minutes. That 8 minutes is just for
the ride. Not included is the delay time it would take to
find the President, interrupt whatever he was doing, quickly
brief him, allow him to react, get him and whatever cadre he
required to the helicopter and fly him to NEACP. Of course
if the President were somewhere other than the White House,
the problem is compounded and the time would probably take
considerably longer. When one considers that the average
flight time of an SLBM to strike the Washington area, from
first warning to impact could be less than 5 minutes, it
seem unlikely that the President would be aboard NEACP.
[Ref. 16: p. 14]
The President is empowered to delegate his authority for
nuclear release under certain and special circumstances.
These special circumstances would probably be in effect if
the President were disabled and no immediate successor were
available. The succession of presidential authority is well
known and would be in effect in case the President is killed
by a first strike decapitation. But finding the constitu-
tionally designated successor 1
5
and briefing him on the
nuclear options would be less than an optimal situtation.
According to Blair, the right of predelegation by the presi-
dent is succinctly stated by the Congressional Research
Service:
The realities of command and control in the nuclear age
would seem to increase the necessity for prior delega-
tion under certain carefully defined conditions. For
example, in the event that the president were disabled
in a surprise attack and his lawful successor were not
immediately accessible. a contingency plan containing a
delegation or authority to order the use of nuclear
The management of, and the location process for the
lawful sucession of the president is a responsibility of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
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weapons under certain conditions would seem to be a
logical and prudent precaution—perhaps necessary to
national survival. [ Ref . 3: p. 112]
Predelegation takes away some of the incentive of a decapi-
tation strike against the U. S. If the Soviets know that
authority to release nuclear weapons survives, even if the
President does not, then, they may be less inclined to
attack the brain and master control of our command and
control process. The loss of the NCA would directly lead to
loss of attack coordination which is a vital element of
positive control and negative control--the next element.
B. POSITIVE/NEGATIVE CONTROL.
Nuclear organizations do not behave like highly abstract
models of rational decision commonly used to explain and
describe nuclear operations. The organizations instead
operate according to built-in decision rules that link
information to pre-programmed responses. These diffuse
rules serve two basic purposes: to prevent unauthorized
launch of nuclear forces and to ensure that fully
authorized launches will be carried out. [Ref. 3:p.281J
Positive control is the attribute required during war, and
provides assurance that any authorized order to release
nuclear weapons will be carried
.
out precisely as ordered.
Negative control is the attribute mainly required during
peace, and provides strict assurance that nuclear weapons
will not be used unless authorized. The NCA must have total
trust, knowing that when the execution order is given, it
will be carried out as planned. Limited war and escalation
control intrinsically depend on this because: to contol war
conclusively to one's advantage, one must have dominance in
the escalation process; to have dominace in the escalation
process, one must have control over one's forces. For
example, if it is thought required to deliver a nuclear
weapon against the opponent's homeland as a signalling func-
tion of serious intent, and will to use nuclear weapons, but
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in a limited way, say, to a target away from populated
areas--Siberia for example--then it is crucial that exactly
that happens. High accuracy in release orders, correct
targeting and correct timing, as well as the right weapon
type and number are all necessary to limit collateral
damage. Otherwise the opponent may not see the attack as a
limited and signalling act; hence, escalation control may be
lost. Of course, positive control is also crucial if esca-
lation control is lost and limited war becomes total war.
In that case the NCA must have the assurance that all SIOP
forces are deployable and employable to meet whatever
requirement is necessary.
There is a complex system of checks and balances of
technical safeguards, organizational structures and opera-
tional procedures precluding unauthorized use and ensuring
release orders are carried out precisely. The 'two-man'
concept and attendant procedures is one of these safeguard
systems where operational control of the launching of
missiles and the dropping of atomic bombs requires at least
two people to act seperately and simutaneously while being
physically separated.
Positive/negative control for the long-range bomber leg
of the triad minimally consists of: (1) Authentication from
several levels of command at SAC headquarters must validate
attack and targeting instructions. This authorization must
occur before any message is transmitted to the SAC airborne
bombers for release orders. However, authentication does
not have to occur to Positive Control Launch (PCL) the
bombers from the air base to avoid destruction on the
ground; (2) Bombers will not proceed to their targets
without positive orders to do so and these orders must be
according to pre-arranged times, plans and in particular
format; (3) The entire process must go according to a pre-
arranged sequence, otherwise the bomber crew must return to
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base. On board the aircraft, to release bombs or cruise
missiles, once the release order has been verified, similiar
constraints and procedures apply.
For positive/negative control of Minuteman ICBM's, a
two-man crew operates a Launch Control Center (LCC) having
operational control over a 10 missile flight. When the
emergency action message (EAM) or go code is received, both
officers in the LCC must independently validate the message
through standardized authentication procedures. They then
select the missiles and targets according to the EAM. To
launch, each officer must insert and turn a key from his
console—both keys must be turned simultaneously and held
for several seconds. This is an example of the two-man rule
where it takes independent and separate actions by at least
two people to launch nuclear weapons. Coupled to this set
of procedures is a 'vote' to launch from another LCC within
the same squadron of missiles. Reception of the vote from
the outside LCC in the same squadron is necessary for the
launch to be executed. This is an example of negative
control, preventing the unauthorized launch by any single
LCC. Navy SLBM's have similiar safeguards requiring at
least two men in different parts of the boat taking simuta-
neous action. It is reported that at least 15 different
individuals at various duty positions are required to launch
an SLBM [ Ref . 16: p. 42].
Negative control, so necessary in peacetime to prevent
the unauthorized start of nuclear war results in a hinder-
ence to positive control in time of war. An electronic
locking device on nuclear weapons known as the Permissive
Action Link (PAL) system requires the input of an enabling
code before those weapons can be armed and fired. The PAL
system is good to have to avoid unauthorized use, but when
positive control is needed—during war—PAL becomes a
delaying factor and slows down the process. When do
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negative control procedures and systems so complicate the
execution of a launch order that the overall confidence of
the decision makers in positive control falls and the
overall launch sequence fails? Desmond Ball, in his often
cited analysis, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?", adds that
these fail-safe mechanisms may lull authorities into a false
sense of security because the systems are so complex to
operate when needed. Hermann Kahn, in his "Thinking About
the Unthinkable in the 1980' s", suggests that the Soviet
Union and the United States have built into their nuclear
systems an increased risk that their forces will not work
well in war, so that the risk that they will be used when
they should not is decreased. He also suggests that because
of this many analysts believe that accidental nuclear war is
unlikely, though not impossible [ Ref . 23: p. 125].
C. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE -
A third requirement for limited war and escalation
control is reliable, survivable, flexible and endurable
command, control, communications and intelligence C3I. The
"Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces",
April 1983 said of C3I: "Our first defense priority should
be to ensure that there is continuing, constitutionally
legitimate, and full control of our strategic forces under
conditions of stress or actual attack. No attacker should be
able to have any reasonable confidence that he could destroy
the link between the President and our strategic forces".
The commission went on to say that the President's C3I
program should have the "highest priority". [Ref. 24: p. 10]
C3I systems in this country are vastly redundant, reli-
able and endurable--during peacetime. But what are the
expected capabilities of the systems when they are needed
most--during the tran-attack and post-attack nuclear envi-
ronments? How will these systems support the limited war
effort after they have sustained one or more attacks? For
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the conduct of limited or protracted nuclear war and escala-
tion control, C3I is second only in importance to the SIOP
forces themselves. This is not to imply that perfection in
these systems is required-- "survivability does not mean
immortality. "
According to Charles A. Zraket, writing for Science
magazine in 1984, as executive vice president of the MITRE
Corporation, C3I,
. . . must have the capabilities to (1) maintain peace-
time readiness and performance of command and control
elements and strategic nuclear forces without serious
accidents and without unnessarily increasing tension
around the world; (2)function during crises, providing
secure conferencing for national authorities and mili-
tary commanders, tracking status of nuclear forces
worldwide, providing dependable intelligence, communi-
cating to the nuclear forces, and permitting joint plan-
ning with our allies and coordination with the Soviet
Union; (3) prevent mistakes or unnecessarily dangerous
events and expedite correct actions; (4) ensure conti-
nuity of national command, positive control of nuclear
weapons and selective retaliation; (5)provide surveil-
lance during and after an attack to assess our status
and that of the adversary; (6) integrate strategic
offense and defense operations; (7) be reconstituted
with proliferated, prepositioned and replenished C3I
assets; and (8) help us coordinate with our allies to
negotiate the end to a war. [ Ref . 25: p. 1307]
That is quite a list! I think all who consider problems
of strategic C3I would agree. But is our C3I system robust
enough to survive the stress that it would have to endure
during a protracted war to accomplish these goals?
1. Factors to Degrade the System
Any nuclear war, but especially a bolt out-of-the
blue, would probably begin with an electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) precursor attack characterized by the detonation of
5-10 weapons high in the atmosphere fired from SLBM's at
short range. This would probably be coincident with jamming
from various sources such as AGI's 16 and covert ground
AGI s are electronic intelligence collecting ships
employed by the Soviet Union that usually appear as fishing
trawlers but are actually sophisticated listening platforms.
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sites; and sabotage committed against soft communication
centers and antennas.
a. Radiation Effects
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is an intense elec-
tromagnetic spike of short duration generated by a complex
process of gamma rays released by a nuclear blast ripping
away electrons from atmospheric molecules which in turn
react with the Earth's magnetic field. This is especially
significant at height of bursts above 19 miles. The field
created by a single weapon in the megaton range at an alti-
tude of several hundred kilometers would cover much of the
United States. For example, a one magaton bomb exploding at
300 km would produce strong EMP effects out to 500 miles
from the point of detonation. [ Ref . 16: p. 11] Typical
predictions for the magnitude for the electromagnetic field
are on the order of 50 , 000 volts/meter and occurs in an
extremely short period of time, on the order of micro-
seconds. This sudden voltage surge is harmless to humans
but is thought to be extremely damaging to solid state elec-
tronics, and other electrical devices. Not much empirical
data exists on EMP since shortly after its effects became
fully appreciated, atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
was stopped by treaty in 1963. Since then much effort has
been put into hardening C3I facilities and hardware from the
effects through grounding, bonding and shielding of elec-
tronic equipment and components, and through the development
of exotic new semi-conductor materials resistant to EMP.
Electromagnetic pulse radiation has a broad spectrum from
very low frequency to very high frequency with most in the
radio frequency range. Electronic equipment is affected by
the voltage surge burning out sensitive electrical compo-
nents such as transistors and diodes and by overloading
integrated circuits designed for low current flows.
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Another type of radiation effect on C3 systems
known as Transient Radiation Effect on Electronics (TREE),
is caused by the excitation of electrons by high energy
x-rays, gamma rays, and neutrons causing an induced secon-
dary current pulse and atomic displacements in materials
used in electronic equipment. These effects damage sensi-
tive components such as diodes, transistors and integrated
circuits in radios, radars, gyroscopes, inertial guidance
systems, computers, etc. [ Ref . 26: p. chap. 8, 11]
Other radiation effects from nuclear explosions
are many and varied, causing signal attenuation, distortion
and interference on command and control systems just at the
time when they are needed most. These degradations in
performance can last from minutes to hours depending on the
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum being used , the
height of burst and the time of day. Electromagnetic
signals that pass through the atmosphere, e. g. ,- VHF and UHF,
commonly used as line-of-sight (LOS) and satellites links,
are affected over localized areas and are usually only
degraded for only a few seconds to a few minutes. However,
systems that depend on signals being reflected, refracted or
scattered by the ionosphere can be degraded for long periods
of time and over great distances. Line-of-sight systems
that propagate below the ionosphere, between ground
stations, or between ground stations and aircraft, or
between aircraft will not experience severe degradation
unless the explosion takes place within the line of sight.
The major consequences of nuclear effects on signal propaga-
tion are phase anomalies and signal attenuation caused by
noise, phase, refraction and scattering effects.
Absorption of energy is the major source of
signal attenuation following a nuclear burst in the atmos-
phere and occurs in electron dense regions caused by high
energy radiation that rips electrons from atmospheric
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components. Absorption, in general, is inversely
proportional to the square of the signal frequency. This
means that signal absorption is most important for lower
frequency wave forms, that is, for systems that use low
frequency signals. The location of the transmission path
relative to the burst point and the time of transmission
relative to the time of burst are directly related to the
amount of signal loss. Empirical data of nuclear effects on
communications is from testing that was not designed to
maximize these effects on communications per se. Many of
the proposed effects contain a significant residual
uncertainty. [ Ref . 26: pp. 479-482]
.
VLF (3-30 kHz) systems suffer from phase changes
due to the lowering of the ionosphere caused by an increase
in electron density by the nuclear blast. The lowering of
the ionosphere lowers the reflection altitude and reduces
the transmission range and produces phase anomalies. The
loss of VHF would have serious consequences on communicating
with the fleet ballistic submarines and aerial navigation
systems. LF (30-300kHz) systems are not as susceptible to
ionizing effects in the atmosphere unless they depend on
skywave propagation between the earth and the ionosphere.
Skywave propagation can be degraded from minutes to hours
following an atmospheric nuclear explosion. MF
( 300kHz-3mHz) systems, typically the AM broacast band,
normally depend on ground wave propagation during the day
and degradation will occur if the detonation occurs within
the path of the ground wave. Military systems are not
highly dependent on MF systems. However, civilian AM
stations are, and they broadcast warnings to the public
along with other vital information. These broadcasts will
be crucial to the civil defense effort. HF (3 mHz-30 mHz
)
systems will probably be seriously affected by atmospheric
nuclear explosions. Many strategic systems depend on HF
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communications. The reflection region of the atmosphere
will be lowered by the blast induced electron dense regions,
thus changing the propagation path. Blackout can occur from
several minutes to several hours with recovery time being a
function of weapon yield and detonation altitude. Daytime,
high altitude bursts at 200 miles would disrupt HF communi-
cations out to 1500 miles from the blast point and it would
be hours before the interference subsided. VHF (30-300mHz)
systems, usually used for LOS communications such as commer-
cial television, FM radio, and many military applications
will not suffer significant disruption since these systems
do not depend on any appreciable reflection by the iono-
sphere to reflect their signals. However, degradation could
be significant if the blast occurred in the path of propaga-
tion. UHF ( 300mHz-3 gHz), commonly used for satellite
communications will suffer no appreciable long term effects
unless, again, the transmission path passes through or near
the fireball. See Figure 8. 1 for a tabular summary of these
effects. [Ref. 26: pp. 482-490]
b. Jamming
Jamming is the selective and deliberate trans-
mission of electromagnetic energy to interfere with, and to
deny the opponent's use of, the electromagnetic spectrum.
Selective C3I elements would certaintly be targets for
jamming in the nuclear war environment. Satellites, radios,
radar, infra-red and optical sensors are all susceptible to
the effects. Jamming effects have been lessened for some
strategic communications systems. Defense Satellite
Communications System III ( DSCS III) satellites have been
made jam resistant and Milstar, when operational in the
early 1990' s, will provide significant anti-jam capability.
c. Blast and Shock Effects
The most readily visible nuclear effects are
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control centers. The most survivable of the non-airborne
command posts, the NMCC, ANMCC and NORAD, can withstand
overpressures in the 3,000-5,000 pounds per square inch
( psi ) range [ Ref . 16: p. 9] but would almost certainly not
survive a near hit.
*
7 All other command posts are more
vulnerable—except the WWABNCP. Communications hardware
such as exposed antennas and cables are very soft and will
not withstand any overpressures greater than 5 psi.
Underground, retractible, pop-up antennas give some added
protection, perhaps as much as 10-40 times more than the
standard aboveground type. The reason that airborne command
posts are more survivable is only because they probably will
not be near the detonation point. If they are; however,
their chances of survival are low. [Ref. 16: p. 10]
d. System Failure
'Operational pathologies', and equipment fail-
ures will always be the achilles heel of C3I operations
during times of crisis and stress. Reliability of perform-
ance for large-scale, complex systems will contain some
residual uncertainty which will never be relieved. The goal
of planning for these crisis situations then, is to reduce
the uncertianty as much as possible so that any failures
that do occur are not totally unexpected; and, contingency
operations can be planned and practiced. Measures other
than mean time between failure (MTBF) and other statistical
probabilities for equipment malfunction need to be examined.
During crises, unforseen stresses must be endured and often
times no reliable data exists to analyze these stressed
situations except for command post and field training exer-
cises. Of course, by definition, unforseen circumstances
cannot be planned for, but realistic exercising of the
systems would greatly help in reducing the number of
17
Current Soviet missile accuracies and a 20 megaton
warhead give a 95% single shot kill probability against a
target hardened to 5,000 psi [Ref. 16: p. 10]
.
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unforseen situations that could arise. Any large C3I system
has many subsystems that have to function reliably for
overall proper system functioning. Seemingly unimportant
pieces of equipment such as power supplies and air
conditioners can stop or impair any large scale, technically
complex system.
Also to be of sure significance in the
protracted nuclear environment will be the effect on humans.
Radiation poisoning, blast, heat and shock effects can
easily be' predicted. But what about the psychological
stresses that must be endured for long term functioning of
the command and control processes? How would the C2 func-
tions endure the crisis of limited war if the operators were
sick, dying and psychologically unfit to continue. This
question can be asked of any war setting, but protracted
nuclear war would fiercely demand new and extrodinary human
performance.
e. Sabotage
Most, if not all C3I assets are vulnerable to
sabotage from Spetsnaz forces. 18 Antennas, repeater sites
and most cabling is unmanned and unprotected. The ease of
mobility these guerilla forces have throughout this country
make us especially vulnerable to sabotage. This is a certain
asymmetry between Soviet capabilities and ours since our
special forces have no similiar ease of movement throughout
the Soviet Union. According to Ball, 380 KGB teams have
been organized for operations against NATO command and
cotrol centers [ Ref . 16: p. 32]. Spetsnaz attack can be
expected to occur in combination with high altitude detona-
tions for EMP effects and jamming at the onset of any
nuclear war.
Spetsnaz--roughly translates to special forces --are
Soviet military personnel used for sabotage, kidnapping,
assassination, and covert military operations.
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2. More C3I required for Limited War
To improve endurance and survivability of C3I facil-
ities and capabilities for limited or protracted nuclear
exchanges, increased hardness to blast overpressure, and EMP
effects; hard to find ground mobile command centers; redun-
dancy in systems deployment and easily reconstituted systems
must be considered as high priority items. Stress on C3I
systems will be greater for limited war than for an unlim-
ited spasm war. Unlimited war requires only that C3I
support a one-time, all-out response. The limited scenario
may last for months and it is crucial for a surviving and
enduring system to exist to support bargaining and negotia-
tion for termination of the conflict.
D. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT/DAMAGE CONTROL
1. Damage Assessment
The next requirement for the containment of war is
the two sided element of damage assessment and damage
control. First, to be able to respond positively and accu-
rately, the NCA must know what damage the SIOP forces have
sustained following a strike. The President can not order
an ICBM launch against time-critical targets if he does not
know whether his missiles exist in their silos. It is vital
that he know the operationsl status of his forces through
accurate damage assessment. How does the President know, if
the very system that supplies the information has sustained
nuclear strikes or spetsnaz attacks against it? Information
the NCA receives will be fragmented and incomplete, with
distortions, deletions and some of plainly erroneous
content. The process of net assessment during peacetime is
subjective and based on probabilistic and statistical anal-
ysis and therefore has built-in uncertainty. Wartime damage
assessment would be even more uncertain since input data
would be less reliable. The ultimate use of assessment will
be for the decision maker--the NCA- -to map out strategies,
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responses and initiations of actions. Questions such as:
What targets are now time critical? What targets are
viable? What is my force status? What targets maximize
opponent destruction and minimize my vulnerability? How
will my opponent react? What damage have I suffered and how
much more can I sustain? Accorcing to Bracken: "In the
destruction and chaos of such a war it is possible that the
only way the president might be able to find out quickly
what had happened would be to order a SAC reconnaissance
plane to Chicago, for example, to look out of the window and
see if it was still there". To carry out the damage assess-
ment mission following a nuclear attack SAC has 50 recon-
naissance aircraft capable of providing some of this
information—if they survive the attack. [ Ref . 21: p. 106]
Besides the SAC reconnaissance aircraft, damage
assessment information would also come from the SIOP forces
themselves, assuming communications links survived
connecting them to the NCA. Commercial telephone lines may
play a big role here since a portion of the system will
survive due to its complex redundancy no matter how severe
the attack. There also exist state, local and federal
government civil defense agencies who report damage informa-
tion to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
FEMA has direct communication capability to other government
agencies including the Department of Defense.
The soon-to-be operational Integrated Operational
Nuclear Detection System (IONDS) will provide added capa-
bility. IONDS will be a worldwide nuclear detection system
deployed on 18 NAVSTAR-Global Positioning Satellites to
become operational in the late 1980' s. Through visible
light sensors IONDS will provide data on number, yield and
location of above ground nuclear blasts to within 100 meters
resolution [Ref. 3: p. 261]. Defense Support System (DSP)
satellites will provide assessment of Soviet capabilities
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after attack, but the DSP ground stations in Australia and
Colorado are not hardened sites and sure to be targeted.
Submarine commanders will not easily be able to report their
status since any transmission from them gives away their
position, and the VLF stations supporting them are not
expected to survive any attack no matter how limited.
This all adds up to an extreme imperfection in the
damage information received by the NCA. Any situation where
less than perfect information exists means that either deci-
sions are delayed, or that wrong decisions may be made based
on faulty data and analysis. In either case the results
could be catastrophic and are detrimental to the concept of
limited war. According to Bracken, Soviet inferiority in
damage assessment works against U. S. security. "The absence
of an assessment system that lets them know the damage
inflicted upon the United States, for instance, severely
reduces the Soviet's options for waging any form of limited
war. They will have reduced information feedback, and this
could reinforce their existing proclivity toward large spasm
attacks." [ Ref . 21: p. 198]
Accurate damage assessment then directly influences
stability during nuclear war. For escalation not to jump
uncontrolled from level to level it is imperative that each
side know its capabilities and the capabilities of the oppo-
nent. "The ability to ascertain reasonably valid estimates
of damage and surviving force status is a cornerstone of
politically directed nuclear attacks." [Ref. 21: p. 118]
2. Damage Control
Damage control is another requirement for limited
war. For escalation to remain constrained to controllable
levels, the amount of destruction suffered by the opponent
must be limited. This is done to keep the action—the war-
within the constraints of the limited political objective.
Ideally, in nuclear war, or any war, doctrines of
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city-avoidance and counterforce attacks would keep the enemy
from attacking population centers for fear of his own cities
being attacked in reprisal, thus, limiting attacks to
strategic nuclear forces, support facilities and command and
control centers. This, however, would be extremely
difficult to acheive, if not impossible for two reasons.
First, many strategic military targets are located very
close to population centers. Therefore, targeting nuclear
forces without also targeting civilians is almost
impossible. Secondly, the enormous destructive power of
nuclear weapons and the far ranging secondary effects create
limitation difficulties.
If adhered to, city-avoidance doctrine may be one
of the most significant contributors to limited nuclear war.
It could be argued that any limited first strike of a
strictly counterforce nature, with no collateral civilian
damage, say against a naval task force at sea, would be
responded to with another similiar strike against only coun-
terforce targets. Of course, this tit-for-tat, action/
reaction of events may soon go out of control and escalate
to countervalue strikes. This is precisely why the require-
ment for avoidance of collateral damage is central to
control of escalation.
To limit collateral damage, the NCA must have (1)
positive control over its nuclear forces, (2) accurate
damage assessment of the near real-time or real-time situ-
ation, (3) SIOP forces technically and operationally capable
of carrying out the limited strike, and (4) the will to
limit damage (or no incentive to do otherwise). To maintain
limits, along with the precise attack, the opponent must
recognize the attack as limited. For it must be realized
that an attack of limited proportions by one side may be
seen as unlimited to the other side. The opponent, if he
chose to respond, then, must limit his attack and this too
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must be seen as limited. How long can these self restraints
and perfect recognitions go on?
According to Ball, the U. S. SIOP contains more than
40,000 potential targets with only 5% being strategic
forces. The remainder are: ..." other military installa-
tions such as airfields, shipyards, ports, army bases,
railway marshalling yards, storage depots, and logistic
facilities; economic and industrial targets such as oil
refineries, power plants, and factories; and political and
military leadership facilities, such as CPSU buildings,
administrative centers, KGB offices military headquarters
and command and control posts." [ Ref . 16: pp. 26,29]
Distinguishing these targets from a countervalue attack by
the recipient of such an attack would be most difficult,
eventhough these targets do not represent countervalue
targeting per se. And, even if strictly counterforce
targeting is applied, with Soviet nuclear forces stationed
so near major population centers as some are, combined with
the many uncertainties involved in ballistic missile
targeting such as CEP, weather conditions, intelligence,
correct target coordinates, inertial guidance systems,
explosive yield, overpressures, interference between deto-
nating warheads, etc. , collateral damage of the civilian
populace can not be reliably controlled or even predicted.
[Ref. 16: p. 28]
If constrained attacks are considered to be used for
controlling escalation, then the targets must be considered
very carefully, since any attack, even one thought to be
counterforce in nature may have the unknown, uncertain
effects of a countervalue character. Anytime the opponent
feels his cities are at risk, escalation control is soon to
be gone.
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E. MECHANISM TO TERMINATE
As previously mentioned, limited war and escalation
control require that a termination of conflict be feasible
and expected by the warring participants. If a mutual
mechanism for termination were not possible, there would be
no incentive to limit actions, in fact, the logical course
of action would be to fight as hard and as swiftly as
possible. Therefore, a method to terminate a nuclear war
must exist if the war is to be kept limited. So much of
command and control is focused on the the pre- attack and the
trans-attack phases of nuclear conflict, with little
emphasis on the post-attack environment and how C2 systems
will be employed to communicate intentions and negotiations
with the adversary. The Direct communications link (DCL) or
Moscow-to-Washington link ('MOLINK'), also known as the
'Hotline', has been in operation since the Kennedy adminis-
tration realized the need to directly communicate with the
Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis. The MOLINK is
simply a teletype system and is planned for an upgrade to
include facsimilie capability. In the event of war, MOLINK
could be used for direct communication between the president
and Soviet leaders, except for one thing: the ground" termi-
nals for MOLINK are soft targets located at Ft. Detrick,
Maryland; and Etam, West Virginia with connectivity to the
NMCC by commercial leased circuits. Any attack on the
Washington area would most likely preclude any use of the
system through direct of collateral nuclear effects. As
Ball says,
The irony is that the DCL is only likely to remain oper-
ational during the period in a nuclear exchange when
restraint is already being exercised for other reasons;
once restraint is abandoned and an exchange progresses
to any large-scale level, the availability of the hot
line could not be relied upon. [ Ref . 16: p. 23]
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This means that if the Soviets want to communicate with U. S.
leaders throughout a nuclear conflict via MOLINK, they must
not attack the Washington area— a highly unlikely possi-
bility based upon their often cited remarks on the impor-
tance of striking at the top of the command and control
structure [ Ref . 2].
F. SHARED LIMITED WAR CONCEPT
Related to the requirement for a mechanism to terminate
any conflict, is the idea that limited war and escalation
control rests upon the notion that war can be limited; and
upon the acceptance by the belligerents of the idea that the
adversary will play by the same rules. These concepts imply
a mutual understanding. The warring parties must have a
similar, if not equal view that war can be limited and that
it is under these constraints that the adversary is engaging
his actions. Recognition of constrained attacks undertaken
by either player for what they are is very important. The
only way to keep nuclear war limited will be if each action
is recognized by the opponent as a constrained action with a
discrete objective. Once the recognition is lost, escala-
tion accelerates with the upward dynamic.
As found lacking in their open literature, the Soviets
have given little evidence in the past of accepting the
notion of limited war [Ref. 2: pp. 15-19]. They believe read-
iness and preparation to wage and win a nuclear war is what
achieves deterrence, not the threat of assured destruction.
Soviet strategic targeting policy stresses massive rather
than sequential nuclear strikes [Ref. 16: p. 31]. Soviet
writers typically reject the notion of limited war:
The concept of limited war, especially a lengthy one, is
highly speculative. .. that is it presupposes that the
other side, too, accepts the 'rules of conduct proposed
to it. This supposition is based on the shaky argument
concerning the relative determination of the sides to
heighten the degree of risk. It is considered that the
other side will limit the strength of its blows, since
otherwise it would get a strike at a higher step of
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nuclear escalation. I. A. Gerasimov, Commander of the
Kiev District, General of the Army. [ Ref s. 2,27:
p. 83,p. 417]
As for me, I never believed in a so-called limited
nuclear war. I simply do not imagine how one can estab-
lish such limitations once any sort of nuclear weapon is
launched. V. D. Sokolovskiy. Marshall of the Soviet
Union. [ Ref s. 2,27: p. 84, p. 52j
A delay in the destruction of means of nuclear attack
will permit the enemy to launch their nuclear strikes
first and may lead to heavy losses and even to the
defeat of the offensive. The 'accumulation of such
targets as nuclear weapons and waiting with the inten-
tion of destroying them subsequently is now absoutely
inadmissible. A. A. Sidorenko, Frunze Academy.
[Refs. 2,27: p. 84, p. 374]
The difference in conceiving of how nuclear war should be,
or will be fought is a significant asymmetry in the stra-
tegic balance between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Without a shared concept to limit nuclear war it
seems likely what war will be fought toward victory, however
defined.
G. CIVIL DEFENSE
The degree of protection of the civilian population and
national leaders will significantly affect limitation
control. If large segments of the population are able to
survive a first strike, massive and spasmotic retaliation
will less likely occur in the follow-on second strike for
fear of a massive countervalue third strike reprisal. This
abilty to survive, a robustness of the population, will add
to escalation control. Secondary nuclear effects such as
fallout, delayed radiation effects, sickness and starvation,
lack of medical care, etc. , can be long-term and wide-
ranging. Any measure that protects the population of a
nation and makes it less susceptible to these secondary
effects will restrain the decision maker from taking a step
up the escalation ladder. Little can be done to protect
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people and property from direct nuclear effects such as
blast, shock, thermal and prompt radiation, but survival
from secondary effects will ease economic and political
strains, and help to maintain a viable work force for indus-
trial production. The better the population is able to
protect itself, the less it will be a burden to the govern-
ment, leaving more options open to the NCA.
Presently the U. S. has little in the way of a civil
defense program for nuclear war. It appears to be politi-
cally unpopular. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is
reported to have an extensive system to protect the populace
and political, economic and military leaders. Ball reports
that 110,000 shelters exist for members of leadership. If
this is true, the Soviets clearly have the advantage in this
asymmetry and could be said to have an extra element in
their favor toward escalation dominance when it comes to
contemplating the escalation step of targeting cities.
H. SUMMARY
In order to limit war certain requirements must be
present and possessed by the warring sides to some extent.
Without these elements, war can become unlimited and esca-
late out of control, or can be lost all together. The
elements I have proposed are not exhaustive, nor do I imply
that they all be present all of the time. The requirements
are: (1) A viable NCA; (2) Positive/negative control;
(3)Effective command, control and communications and intel-
ligence; (4) Damage control/assessment; (5) A shared limited
war concept between belligerents; (6) A war termination
mechanism; and (7) Effective civil defense.
The National Command Authority is required for top-level
decision making, authority and leadership.
Positive/negative control allows the NCA to apportion the
forces appropriately, according to needs. Command, control,
communications and intelligence is the nervous system
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linking the forces together and provides the control struc-
ture. Damage assessment helps allow the NCA to make correct
decisions based on the current status of forces, and damage
control helps limit the escalation process from going out of
control. For limited war to remain so, each side must share
to some extent the concept of limitation. This sharing need
not be equal but must have some common elements. There must
be a mechanism to terminate the conflict at all levels.
And, to allow the decision maker as many flexible options as
possible in the limiting process, the NCA must be confident
to some extent that his people and cities will survive. The
cities cannot be protected, but people can. An effective
civil defense program gives the NCA more options.
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IX. DISCUSSION
Can nuclear war be managed to an acceptable conclusion,
stopping at some less than total, all-out level of conflict
where both sides are left to be little more than a heap of
smoldering ruin? The constraints necessary to keep war
limited to a less than all-out level are not well understood
since we have no empirical data for protracted nuclear war,
and very little experience of nuclear war-- Hiroshima and
Nagasaki notwithstanding. The concepts of limited war and
escalation control are static in their description and
applying them to a dynamic situation of rising tensions and
force mobilization may be somewhat arbitrary and unreal-
istic. However, static models may be acceptable under the
circumstances.
This final chapter shall attempt to offer some answers
to previous questions raised with respect to the concepts of
limited nuclear war, escalation control and command, control
and communications.
A. NUCLEAR - CAN BE LIMITED
1. Adopt the Actor- Image Paradigm
What is meant to control nuclear war and how do we
know when we have it? The idea that nuclear war can be
controlled may seem paradoxical. Some may speciously argue
that any situation leading to war, especially nuclear war is
out of control at the start and therefore cannot be
controlled afterwards. Assuming an existing NCA, command
and control and the forces necessary to carry out national
policy, I believe nuclear war can be controlled if: (1) Each
side in the conflict has specific political objectives at
the beginning of the conflict and maintains those objec-
tives; (2) Each national level command authority type
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decision maker has an expectation that the war will remain
limited, i. e. , each side shares to some extent a common
concept of limiting the war and the political objectives
that precipitated the conflict, and structures their actions
within the concepts of limitation; (3) A mechanism to
terminate the conflict exists; (4) Positive control of
forces to launch on command, and negative control to
preclude unauthorized nuclear release is firmly in place;
and (5) a plan to protect the citizenry. These elements are
necessary to maintain some constraints on the upward dynamic
attendant with conflict and war. The object of control is
to acheive the political objective without moving up the
escalation ladder, either as a reaction to the opponent's
initiative—the 'actor-image' model, or, because each side
is caught up in an ever increasing series, or continuum of
events beyond the control of the players--the
'phenomenal-image' model. I believe actual conflict to be
an amalgam of these two paradigms, but for limited nuclear
war the actor- image model should be the paradigm adopted by
decision makers. With this concept in mind, nuclear
conflict will be series of discrete steps intended for
specific purposes and will then give credence to the idea of
limiting war. If the phenomenal-image model is solely
adopted as the paradigm, little is to be controlled by each
player and the conflict will take its own course--so why
bother to exercise constraints? The phenomenal-image model
of nuclear war leads to uncontrolled escalation if that is
the paradigm of the opposing sides.
2. Two Aspects of Control
a. Control of Forces
We know we have control when we possess two
aspects of nuclear war: control over the nuclear forces,
that is, properly functioning positive/negative control
measures; and control over the process of war, that is,
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maintenance of escalation dominance. Properly functioning
positive and negative control means that direct control of
the forces exists. This is the ability to operate and exer-
cise the nuclear forces as they were designed for the
purpose of war. Without absolute assurance of this control,
the national level decision makers have many fewer options.
b. Control Over the Process of War
One half of the control of nuclear war then is
to possess the necessary resources to fight to win a war,
and the ability to use them when planned. The other half of
controlling nuclear war is to maintain escalation dominance.
That is, the ability to control the movement of the conflict
up and down the escalation ladder at whatever step the
conflict currently resides. Escalation dominance gives the
NCA control over the events of war as it precedes through
its phases, i. e. , escalation dominance provides control over
the process of war.
B. DOES OUR C3 SUPPORT LIMITED WAR?
Does the United States possess C3 capability consistent
with the limited war concept? This question is difficult to
answer here for two reasons. First, to rigorously analyze
our C3 systems, highly classified information must be
included. Since this paper is intended for a general audi-
ence at the unclassified level, no fully adequate answer can
be offered. Secondly, to know if our C3 systems work under
conditions of protracted nuclear war, they must be tested
under those conditions. We will not know if our command and
control systems work as planned unless we use them under
actual conditions of war--a problem most of us are glad
about and hope will never change.
Given the above qualification, does our C3 sytem support
the concept of limited war? I believe it does, but only for
very limited war, and only when the necessary elements such
as a viable NCA, shared and similiar war concepts between
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belligerents, an existing termination mechanism, damage
control and assessment, etc. exist. Using Kahn's escalation
ladder as a framework, and viewing limited war as existing
as somewhere in the lower rungs, certaintly below step #40
where cities are beginning to be targeted, (see pp. 25-27)
and probably much lower, our systems will probably do the
job. We have highly sophisticated computers and communica-
tions systems, vast redundancy, comprehensive procedures,
and talented and trained personnel. Will these systems work
under the severe stresses of protracted nuclear war? No one
knows for sure until it happens. However, we do know that
the system will not perform under conditions of the trans-
attack and post-attack environment as it does during peace.
Our command and control capability will be seriously
degraded even after a limited nuclear strike against major
command and control centers such as the NMCC, the ANMCC, and
NORAD; and the SIOP forces, such as missile silos, bomber
bases and ballistic missile submarine facilities. Serious
degradation of control will result as a consequence of
possible loss and/or disorganization of the NCA; loss of
major command centers, with subsequent reliance on airborne
command centers during the trans-attack phase; degraded
communications capability from EMP, blast, thermal and
prompt radiation effects; and possible destruction of a
social structure not accustomed to adversity, and few if any
civil defense measures. Portions of the system will work
and most certaintly portions will not work. Determining
which will and which will not is dependent on the attack
scenario. The systems for disseminating the go code may be
redundant enough to transmit the message, but if the NCA
does not have proper damage assessment information, there
exists little confidence in effective response actions.
Submarine forces may survive but if the highly vulnerable
VLF stations supporting them and TACAMO are targeted, little
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can be made of their fire-power. Can our C3 systems support
a limited war? The answer is uncertain. It will depend on
the attack scenario, capabilities existing at the time of
attack, whether the forces are dispersed adequately when the
bombs begin to fall, what decisions the NCA makes with




Limited war and the bases upon which the concept is
built, of constraining the means of war, and limiting the
objectives of the actions of war, are obtained and described
through escalation control. If. taken together, escalation
control and concepts of limited nuclear war imply a
protracted conflict between superpowers that may last days
weeks, or months. A protracted nuclear war will be one of
unknown stresses and will probably demand a massive human
and technological effort. A nuclear war may begin with as
many (or as few) as several hundred weapons falling on
missile silos, airbases, submarine bases and command and
control centers. How will it be possible to pass all rele-
vant information from the silo, .up through the system to the
NCA where all relevant assessment information must be
absorbed and a wise and deliberate response decision made,
matching the response to the degree of the attack to avoid
uncontrolled escalation? Most likely a rapid action-
reaction response will occur, but if war is to be limited
and effective, the response should be cold and deliberate to
maximize whatever force effectiveness is remaining and to
maintain the actor-image paradigm. Action-reaction
responses stress the decision makers to make timely and
correct decisions, and it pressures the command and control
system to present the assessment to the NCA correctly and
completely, and then to transmit the execution order
correctly and completely. This decision and execution must
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all take place in an extremely uncertain environment of
primary and secondary nuclear effects/ against an opponent
who may or may not share our views of the limiting process,
and it must be done with a system that will probably support
limited war only at low levels and never tested under these
conditions.
It is possible that the greatest deterrence to nuclear
war is the uncertainty attendent in its occurrence. Nuclear
war may be suicidal; although, this near axiom of strategic
thought is not an immutable law. Something less than mutual
suicide and total destructuion is probably more likely, and
that something amounts to limited and protracted nuclear
conflict, no matter how unlimited it may seem. What will
allow the "something less" than total war for each side is
several fold--nuclear forces appropriate to the task of
limited and protracted conflict; effective coordination of
those nuclear forces through command, control, communica-
tions and intelligence; a political and military structure
that allows for deliberate, and prescient decision making;
economic viability to ride out the conflict period; and the
will to limit war. These elements will characterize the
nation that seeks to survive.
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